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Revolutionary Reform in German
Constitutional Law
BY STEPHAN JAGGI1
Introduction
In his article “Three Paths to Constitutionalism – and the Crisis of the
European Union” Bruce Ackerman argues that the Federal Republic of
Germany stands for a way to constitutionalism in which “ordinary citizens
remain passive while political and social elites construct a new
constitution”.2 Ackerman calls this model “elitist constitutionalism”3 and
distinguishes it from two other models, the revolutionary model where
successful revolutionary outsiders embed their revolutionary principles in a
new constitution, and the insider model in which pragmatic insiders
undermine revolutionary movements by enacting landmark reform
legislation that brings about fundamental change but keeps the insiders in
power.4 The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), according to
Ackerman, has contributed to resolving the German Constitution’s
legitimacy problem not by referring to revolutionary achievements of the
constitutional past but by projecting itself “as the preeminent guardian of
Germany’s post-1945 foundational commitments.”5
My thesis is that, since German unification in October 1990, this
diagnosis of constitutionalism in Germany is only partly true. I will show

1. Associate Professor of Law, Peking University School of Transnational Law, and
formerly a Judge at the Supreme Court of the State of Schleswig-Holstein/Germany. The
topic of this article is part of a broader analysis of the East German 1989 Revolution and its
impact on unified Germany’s constitutional law in STEPHAN JAGGI, THE 1989 REVOLUTION IN
EAST GERMANY AND ITS IMPACT ON UNIFIED GERMANY’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE
FORGOTTEN REVOLUTION? (Hart and Nomos, 2016)
2. Bruce Ackerman, Three Paths to Constitutionalism – and the Crisis of the European
Union, B.J.Pol.S. 45, 705 (2015).
3. Id., at 707.
4. See id., at 707 et seq.
5. Id., at 711.
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that, in the wake of German unification, the BVerfG acted within
Ackerman’s revolutionary model and did refer to revolutionary
achievements of the constitutional past. Contrary to Ackerman’s evaluation,
the Court engaged in what I call “revolutionary reform” of German
constitutional law by taking up revolutionary constitutional achievements of
the East German 1989 Revolution and integrating them into the existing
constitutional order under the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz; GG).
It is through revolutionary reform, I will argue, that the BVerfG has brought
important change to unified Germany’s constitutional law.
It is right that popular sovereignty did not amount to more than idle talk
during the adoption of the GG in 1949. Since then, the West German party
system has successfully kept democracy strictly representative and has
reduced the people’s political role to that of voters on Election Day. The
East German 1989 Revolution, however, confronted Germans with a
completely new political experience: popular sovereignty can work, not only
as a theoretical concept to legitimize the existing political order but as a
practical experience of political action. I have shown elsewhere that East
Germans with their 1989 Revolution not only abolished a party dictatorship
and threw open the door to German unification. They adopted an own set of
constitutional principles and succeeded in transferring at least some of these
principles to unified Germany.6 In this article, I will demonstrate how
unified Germany’s institutions in general and the BVerfG in particular
integrated these principles into the existing constitutional order under the GG
in acts of revolutionary reform.
After briefly summarizing the East German revolutionaries’
constitutional achievements and their transfer to unified Germany, I will first
give a brief overview of how unified Germany’s legislature mostly failed at
integrating these achievements into unified Germany’s constitutional order.
One exception to this rule is the principle of constitutional environmental
protection, which the legislature integrated successfully. A case analysis
will then show how it was primarily the BVerfG who used constitutional
interpretation as a means to successfully integrate revolutionary
achievements into the existing constitutional order under the GG and bring
some important change to Germany’s constitutional law.

6. Stephan Jaggi, Revolutionary Constitutional Lawmaking in Germany - Rediscovering
the German 1989 Revolution, 17 GERMAN L.J. 579 (2016).
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A. Revolutionary Achievements and their Transfer to Unified
Germany
As I have elaborated elsewhere, the East Germans used their revolution
to develop a distinct constitutional agenda the core elements of which may
be summarized as individual empowerment and environmental protection.7
Individual empowerment stands for a set of constitutional social rights and
principles that seek to realize individual rights—to make them a social reality
rather than merely a formal legal position. For example, the revolutionaries
demanded a right to decent housing, a right to labor, free access to public
education, and a right to a system of social security aimed at enabling people
to live a life of equal opportunity and independence. They, moreover, called
for real equality for women, for example through a government obligation to
promote equal treatment of women on the job and in public life, in education,
in the family, and in the field of social security, as well as a right to a “selfdetermined pregnancy” and a government obligation to protect the unborn
life through public welfare.8 Constitutional environmental protection
establishes constitutional government obligations to protect the environment
and provide individual rights to that effect. For example, the revolutionaries
demanded a constitutional obligation of the government and all citizens to
protect the natural environment as a “foundation of life for present and future
generations”.9 The government’s environmental policy must prevent
damage to the environment and make sure that natural resources are used
moderately, and everybody who claims that her health is endangered by
environmental destruction shall have a right of access to environmental data
of her living environment.10
In a next step, the revolutionaries used the so-called Unification Treaty
(UT)11, a treaty that the first freely elected East German government entered
into with the West German government that determined the conditions of
German unification, as well as the constitutions of the newly established East
German states to transfer these principles to unified Germany.12
Once transferred, the traditional and most obvious way of integrating
7. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 582 et seq., 585 et seq., 595 et seq.
8. Id. at 597.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The Treaty’s official name is Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands Einigungsvertrag - v. 31. August 1990 (BGBl II S. 889).
12. For a detailed analysis, see Id., at 612 et seq.
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revolutionary achievements into the existing West German constitutional
order under the GG was to either amend the GG or to adopt a completely
new constitution. These were the two options referred to in Art. 5 UT, which
“recommended” that, within two years after unification, the “legislative
institutions of unified Germany” deal with questions of amending or
complementing the GG that were raised “in the context of unification”. Art.
5 UT listed particular questions the legislature was encouraged to tackle,
such as the question of adding state-goal provisions to the GG and the
question of adopting a new constitution through a plebiscite.13
It soon became clear, however, that unified Germany’s federal
legislature was reluctant to touch the GG. Since amending the GG requires
a 2/3 majority in both chambers of the federal legislature, conservatives
managed to prevent many of the changes referred to in the UT. Yet, where
the legislature failed, the BVerfG stepped in and integrated revolutionary
achievements into the existing West German constitutional order through
constitutional interpretation.
In what follows, I will first briefly summarize the legislature’s mostly
futile attempts to integrate revolutionary achievements into unified
Germany’s constitutional order in order to then show where and how the
BVerfG mastered the integrative challenge.

B. Integration Through the Legislature
Most authors argue that the legislature was completely free in deciding
whether or not to follow Art. 5 UT’s “recommendations” to deal with
questions of amending the GG in order to integrate revolutionary
achievement.14 They, moreover, argue that any change of the existing
constitutional order, including the decision to adopt a new constitution
through a plebiscite, had to be made in compliance with the GG and thus
required a 2/3 majority in both chambers of the federal legislature.15 Facing
a conservative majority in the Bundestag16, the chances for constitutional
change through the legislature were low.
13. See Art. 5 UT.
14. See Klaus Stern, Die Wiederherstellung der staatlichen Einheit, in: Klaus Stern &
Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu (eds.), Verträge und Rechtsakte zur Deutschen Einheit, Band 2:
Einigungsvertrag und Wahlvertrag, 3, 47 (1990) with further references.
15. See id. at 47 et seq. with further references.
16. The German federal legislature consists of two chambers, the Bundestag which is the
federal parliament, and the Bundesrat which is the chamber representing the state
governments.
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The federal legislature started several initiatives to pursue the task
embedded in Article 5 UT. The most serious one was the so-called “Board
of Trustees for a democratically constituted Federation of German States”
(“Kuratorium für einen demokratisch verfaßten Bund deutscher Länder”)
(Kuratorium),17 a citizens’ initiative founded in Berlin on June 16, 1990 and
consisting of 200 members with different backgrounds from East and West
Germany.18 The Kuratorium’s goal was to call a Constitutional Convention
to draft a new constitution for unified Germany, which should then be put to
a plebiscite by the German people.19 The Kuratorium produced a draft
constitution20 that clearly reflected revolutionary achievements by
promoting individual empowerment through social rights (rights to labor,
social security, and housing),21 affirmative action for women, and a right to
abortion and well as environmental protection by placing “the conservation
of nature” for present and future generations as well as “nature in its own
right” under particular protection.22 The Draft was presented to the public
on June 16, 1991, in Frankfurt, but then died a silent death because of its
inability to muster the necessary 2/3 majority in the federal legislature
necessary to put it to a plebiscite.
The next initiative was undertaken by the Bundesrat who established a
“Commission Constitutional Reform of the Bundesrat” (“Kommission
Verfassungsreform des Bundesrates”) consisting of representatives of all 16
states.23 The Commission proposed to add to the GG environmental
protection as a goal to be pursued by the government24 but was unable to
agree on anything with respect to social rights or equality for women.25

17. For an overview of the Kuratorium and its work, see Gerald Häfner, Denkschrift zum
Verfassungsentwurf des Kuratoriums für einen demokratisch verfassten Bund deutscher
Länder, in: Erich Fischer & Werner Künzel (eds.), Verfassungsdiskussion und
Verfassungsgebung 1990 bis 1994 in Deutschland, Kommentare und Dokumente, Band I, 53
et seq. (2005); Bernd Guggenberger & Ulrich Preuß & Wolfgang Ullmann (eds.), Eine
Verfassung für Deutschland (1991).
18. See Erich Fischer, Vom Runden Tisch zum Grundgesetz, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra
note 17, 36.
19. See id. at 57 et seq.
20. See The Kuratorium’s Draft Constitution of June 29, 1991 (Kuratorium’s Draft),
reprinted in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 259 et seq.
21. See Art. 12a, 12b, and 13a Kuratorium’s Draft.
22. See Art. 20a Kuratorium’s Draft; Häfner, supra note 17, 62, 74, 75.
23. For this and the following, see Fischer, supra note 18, 48.
24. See Bericht der Kommission Verfassungsreform des Bundesrates of May 14, 1992,
reprinted in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 420 et seq., 451.
25. Id. at 444 et seq., 450 et seq.
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Finally, Bundestag and Bundesrat decided to establish a joint
commission, the so-called Joint Constitutional Commission (Gemeinsame
Verfassungskommission, GVK) to tackle Art. 5 UT’s “recommendations”.
It consisted of 64 representatives, 32 from each chamber,26 only eleven of
which were East Germans.27 From the outset the GVK emphasized that its
task was not only Art. 5 UT but more generally to “examine the
constitutional questions regarding the necessity to amend the GG that had
come up in the political discussion”.28 The GVK, too, operated under a 2/3
majority requirement to adopt any proposals, and despite the fact that social
rights, such as labor, housing, and social security mustered majorities in the
GVK they could not overcome the 2/3-hurdle.29 Most of the GVK’s
proposals were thus related to furthering Germany’s European integration
and to improving the relationship between the federal government and the
states.30 Still, the GVK succeeded in making two proposals with respect to
integrating revolutionary achievements. It proposed to add to the GG (i) a
state goal of environmental protection and (ii) a new sentence to Art. 3 II GG
according to which the government furthers the implementation of equal
rights for women and men and promotes the removal of existing
disadvantages.31 Based on these proposals the federal legislature on
September 23, 1994 adopted the following amendments to the GG:32
Art. 3 II, 2 GG: The government shall promote the implementation of
26. See Eckart Busch, Die Gemeinsame Verfassungskommission von Bundestag und
Bundesrat - eine neuartige Institution in der 12. Wahlperiode, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra
note 17, 96 et seq.
27. This is pointed out by Hans-Jochen Vogel in a speech during the meeting of the
Bundestag on Feb. 4, 1994; see the Stenographic Report of the meeting, reprinted in: Fischer
& Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 694 et seq. (701).
28. See GVK Report, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 522; the original
reads: “Sie [the GVK] sah es auch als ihre Aufgabe an, in der politischen Diskussion aktuell
gewordene verfassungsrechtliche Fragen im Hinblick auf die Notwendigkeit einer Änderung
des Grundgesetzes zu untersuchen.“
29. See GVK Report, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 589; Peter Quint,
The Imperfect Union, Constitutional Structures of German Unification, 117 (1997).
30. For a list of the amendments to the GG proposed by the GVK, see Recommendations
of the Common Constitutional Commission on Changing and Complementing the
Grundgesetz, reprinted in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 684 et seq. For the
extended version of the GVK recommendations, including annotations, see GVK Report, in
Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 527 et seq.
31. Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, at 684.
32. September 23, 1994 is the day on which the Bundesrat accepted the GG-amending
law as adopted by the Bundestag on September 6, 1994; see Beschluß des Bundesrates v.
23.09.1994, reprinted in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 1002. For the GGamending law, see BGBl I 1994, 3146.
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equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate existing
disadvantages;
Art. 20a GG: Mindful of its responsibility towards future generations,
the government shall protect the natural foundations of life by legislation
and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial action, all
within the framework of the constitutional order.33
East Germans were disappointed with these results. Roland Resch, for
example, Minister from the East German state of Brandenburg, complained
that revolutionary experiences demands had not been sufficiently taken into
account.34 Konrad Elmer complained that the debate within the GVK had
been neither sufficiently public nor sufficiently open to new arguments and
that East German concerns had not sufficiently been considered.35 But also
the West German Hans-Jochen Vogel complained that the changes were
minimal and signified a missed opportunity to modernize and improve the
GG.36 Conservatives, on the other hand, welcomed the lack of major
change.37
Despite many revolutionaries’ disappointment, I think that the new
Article 20a GG must be considered a successful integration into the GG of
the revolutionary demand for constitutional environmental protection.
As regards Art. 20a GG’s content, it is undisputed that it establishes
environmental protection as an objective constitutional goal, not as a
subjective individual right.38 As such, it is binding on all governmental
institutions but does not grant an individual right to bring a law suit based on
the claim that Art. 20a GG has been violated. It is also uncontroversial that
33. This version entered into force on Nov. 15, 1994. The state goal of animal protection
was added in 2002 (BGBl I 2002, 2862); see Rupert Scholz, in Theodor Maunz & Günther
Dürig, Grundgesetz, Art. 20a, para. 1 (62 ed. 2011).
34. See Resch, in: GVK Final Session Protocol, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17,
Band II, 508, 509.
35. See Elmer, in: GVK Final Session Protocol, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17,
Band II, 509.
36. Hans Jochen Vogel, Aus dem Wesen nichts Neues, Neue Justiz (NJ), 145 et seq., 149
(1994).
37. See the statements of CDU/CSU and FDP representatives, in: GVK Final Session
Protocol, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 494 et seq. and in: Stenographic
Report of the 209. Meeting of the Bundestag on Feb. 4, 1994, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra
note 17, Band III, 694 et seq.; from the literature, see, for example, Josef Isensee, Mit blauem
Auge davongekommen - das Grundgesetz - Zu Arbeit und Resultaten der Gemeinsamen
Verfassungskommission, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1993, 2583, 2584; Quint,
The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 116.
38. See for this and the following Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a, para. 32 et seq. with
further references.
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Art. 20a GG marks the first time that the GG includes an explicit state goal
of environmental protection.39
Conservatives hold the view that Art. 20a GG’s adoption was,
regardless of its outward connection with Art. 5 UT, “not really caused by
unification” and had no “immediate-substantive relation” with it.40 They
deny any meaningful connection between the 1989 Revolution, unification,
and the introduction of environmental protection into the GG. Instead, they
to explain Art. 20a GG as the product of a constitutional debate that had been
going on in West Germany for many years.41 This opinion’s bottom line is
that all political parties in West Germany agreed on constitutional
environmental protection; it only took them until 1994 to finally find a
common formulation and adopt the new Art. 20a GG.42
I think that this is wrong. Emphasizing the deep roots of constitutional
environmental protection in West German political discourse, conservatives
are unable to answer an important question: Why had West German parties
been unable to agree on constitutional environmental protection prior to
German unification, but were able to adopt Art. 20a GG in 1994 four years
after German unification as the result of a constitutional debate based on Art.
5 UT?
Most authors avoid that question.43 One author at least concedes some
correlation between Art. 20a GG, the 1989 Revolution, and German
unification. Michael Kloepfer writes that “[w]ith unification the climate with
respect to constitutional amendments at the federal level changed,
particularly regarding environmental protection . . . .” He, moreover, refers
to the fact that both the Treaty on the Currency, Economic, and Social Union
and the UT stipulated environmental protection as a goal of unified
Germany.44 Kloepfer considers this an acknowledgement of “the outstanding
role that citizens’ and environmental groups had played in overthrowing the

39. Id. para. 30.
40. See Rupert Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a para. 1.
41. See Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a paras. 3 et seq.
42. See Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a paras. 19 et seq., 25; Nicolai Müller-Bromley,
Verfassungsentwicklung zum Umweltschutz in Deutschland 1990-1194, in: Fischer &
Künzel, supra note 17, 269 et seq.
43. Scholz, for example, does not say a word as to why an agreement had finally become
possible; see Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a GG; similarly Müller-Bromley, supra note 42,
267 et seq.
44. Michael Kloepfer, in: Rudolf Dolzer & Wolfgang Kahl & Christian Waldhoff et al.
(eds.), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 116. Aktualisierung, April 2005, Art. 20a para.
7; also Michael Kloepfer, Umweltschutz als Verfassungsrecht: Zum neuen Art. 20 a GG,
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (DVBl) 1996, 73.
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GDR regime”.45 He hints at “political pressure” on unified Germany’s
federal legislature, which had increased in the aftermath of unification and
speculates that the legislature saw constitutional environmental protection as
a chance to lend some “glamour” to the otherwise “dry” project of reforming
the GG.46
I want to provide a more specific and a more specifically constitutional
explanation. My thesis is that Art. 20a GG is the result of a popular mandate
that the revolutionary East Germans had given unified Germany’s
legislature. Environmental protection featured prominently on the
revolutionaries’ constitutional agenda, it was transferred to unified
Germany, and the new Art. 20a GG integrated it into the existing GG.
The East German citizens’ movements had made environmental
protection an important goal of the new government they had wanted to
establish through their peaceful revolution.47 That can already be seen in the
citizens’ movements’ “Call for an independent GDR”, published in
November 1989. The call mentioned environmental protection right next to
revolutionary goals, such as peace, individual freedom, and social justice.48
Reconciling a market economy with democracy, individual rights, social
justice, and environmental protection had been at the heart of the citizens’
movements’ constitutional agenda.49 Environmental protection groups had
been among the first opposition groups in the GDR in the 1980s.50
The people in the streets had adopted environmental protection as an
important constitutional goal of their Revolution. Pictures of Monday
demonstrations in Leipzig, for example, show banners warning against
“progress without ecology” and “ecological death” and demanding “more
ecology in industry and the agrarian economy” right next to banners calling
for the SED government’s resignation, free elections, and German
unification.51 Tetzner, a regular participant in these demonstrations, writes
that “the stinking rivers” and “the often toxic air in the city” were among the

45. Kloepfer, in: Dolzer & Kahl & Waldhoff et al. (eds.); supra note 44, Art. 20a para.
7; GDR stands for “German Democratic Republic”, East Germany’s name prior to German
unification.
46. Id.
47. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 583 et seq., 587.
48. Id. at 585.
49. Id. at 583 et seq.
50. See Rainer Tetzner, Leipziger Ring, Aufzeichnungen eines Montagsdemonstraten
1989/90, 53 (2004).
51. These banners are visible on pictures of Monday demonstrations in Leipzig on
display in Zeitgeschichtliches Forum Leipzig, Grimmaische Strasse 6, 04109 Leipzig.
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demonstrators’ major concerns.52
The revolutionaries’ early efforts at drafting a new constitution for East
Germany featured a modernized individual rights catalogue including,
among other things, environmental protection.53
East Germany’s first freely elected government, too, had emphasized
its commitment to environmental protection by formulating the goal of
establishing an ecologically responsible social market economy and
presenting environmental protection as a key element of a planned economic
cooperation with West Germany and the European Community.54
Art. 5 and 34 UT as well as the new state constitutions had transferred
the revolutionary achievement of constitutional environmental protection to
unified Germany.55
Against this background, the revolutionary East Germans had given
unified Germany’s federal legislature a clear mandate to introduce
environmental protection into the GG; the West Germans had agreed by
signing the UT. Viewed from this perspective, the fact that controversies that
had prevented the introduction of environmental protection into the GG for
more than 20 years could be overcome in 1994 acquires a new meaning.
What conservatives try to present as the result of pure chance or “political
pressure” starts to appear as a legislative act of integrating the revolutionary
achievement of constitutional environmental protection into the existing
constitutional order under the GG.
Signs of this integrative effort are visible in the text of the new Art. 20a
GG. The responsibility for “future generations” is a clear reference to the
revolutionaries’ early draft constitution, the so-called Round Table Draft
(RTD), which was the first constitutional document in Germany to refer to
“future generations” in connection with environmental protection.56 As a
result of integration, the revolutionaries’ original demand for a judicially
enforceable constitutional right to environmental protection (as expressed in
the constitutional right to information about environmental data and in the
52. Tetzner, supra note 50.
53. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 597.
54. See Government Declaration delivered by Minster President Lothar de Maiziere to
the GDR Parliament (Volkskammer) on Apr. 19, 1990, published as CDU Texte 3/90 by the
Geschäftsstellle des Parteivorstandes der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands
(CDU), Charlottenstrasse 53/54, Berlin 1086, p. 11.
55. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 620. Art. 16 of the Treaty on the Establishment of a Currency,
Economic, and Social Union of May 18, 1990, had already stipulated environmental
protection as a goal of the contracting parties (i.e., the GDR and West Germany). Referring
to this Art. 16, Art. 34 UT states that environmental protection is the legislature’s task.
56. See Art. 33 (1) RTD; Jaggi, supra note 6, 596; Müller-Bromley, supra note 42, 268.
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right of environmental groups to bring law suits)57 has given way to
environmental protection as a purely objective government goal. There is no
doubt that the new Art. 20a GG’s text reflects a “formula compromise” that
enables the political opponents to interpret it in a way that it says whatever
they want it to say.58 Still, Art. 20a GG manifests the revolutionary
achievement of constitutional environmental protection in an explicit
provision of the GG for the first time in the GG’s history. It is thus more
meaningfully described as a successful legislative act of integrating a
revolutionary constitutional achievement than as political happenstance.
The success with respect to environmental protection, however, must
not obscure the fact that the legislature mostly failed in its attempts to
integrate transferred revolutionary achievements into unified Germany’s
constitutional order. This is why the BVerfG stepped in and took over the
integrative function. In what follows I will explain major BVerfG decisions
in the aftermath of German unification neither doctrinally nor as acts of
judicial politics but as attempts to integrate revolutionary achievements into
the existing constitutional order under the GG through constitutional
interpretation.

C. Integration Through the BVerfg
In the aftermath of German unification, the BVerfG decided a number
of major cases that mark clear changes compared to what the Court had been
saying prior to unification. All changes are related to topics that featured
prominently on the 1989 Revolution’s constitutional agenda. It started with
Bodenreform I59 in 1991, where the Court upheld the confirmation of the socalled Bodenreform-expropriations in Art. 143 III GG. Then came
Nachtarbeit60 in 1992, where the Court established a government obligation
to realize equality for women two years before the legislature managed to
confirm that obligation in the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG. It followed Abortion II61
57. See Art. 33 (3) RTD and some of the new states’ constitutions, see Jaggi, supra note
6, 625.
58. That is particularly conspicuous in Scholz’s annotation of Art. 20a GG, where Scholz
tries to interpret an anthropocentric orientation as well as a “Gesetzgebungsvorbehalt” into
the provision, even though these were the points on which the CDU had compromised; see
Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a paras. 38 et seq. and 41 et seq.
59. BVerfG Urteil v. 23.04.1991, 1 BvR 1170, 1174, 1175/90; NJW 1991, 1597 et seq.
60. BVerfG Urteil v. 28.01.1992, 1 BvR 1025/82, 1 BvL 16/83, 1 BvL 10/91, BVerfGE
85, 191-214; see infra, 249 et seq.
61. BVerfG, Urteil v. 28.05.1993, 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, 2 BvF 5/92, NJW 1993, 1751
et seq.; see infra, 273 et seq.
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in 1993, which gave up the requirement of criminal punishment of abortions
during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy after counseling. Finally, also
in 1993, the Court introduced the protection of a tenant’s right to ownership
in the rented apartment as property under Art. 14 I, 1 GG.62
In all these cases, most authors have either denied any changes or have
tried to explain them either doctrinally or as acts of judicial politics. This is
what I want to call the traditional understanding of the cases. My thesis is
that the traditional understanding overlooks the 1989 Revolution as an event
with a substantial meaning for unified Germany’s constitutional law. I will
argue that the Court’s decisions are more realistically and more meaningfully
explained as acts of integrating revolutionary achievements into the existing
constitutional order under the GG through constitutional interpretation.
I. Bodenreform
One of the most hotly debated topics of German unification was the
treatment of expropriations63 initiated by the Soviet occupying force on the
territory of the Soviet occupation zone (later the GDR) between 1945 and
1949 (the so-called Bodenreform-expropriations, or Bodenreform).64
Viewing the big landowners in East Germany (the so-called Junkers) as
pillars of the Nazi regime, the Soviet Union wanted to fundamentally
restructure German society in the occupied territory after the end of World
War II. One means to this end was what came to be known as the

62. BVerfG, Beschluss v. 26.05.1993, 1 BvR 208/93, BVerfGE 89, 1-14; see infra, 297
et seq.
63. Many authors think the term “expropriations” does not properly describe the facts of
the case. Such authors argue that expropriations are governmental takings for the common
good while the Bodenreform-takings where directed against a specific class of property
holders for political reasons. They were thus “confiscations”; see, for example, Hans-Jürgen
Papier, Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme der Eigentumsregelung im Einigungsvertrag, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1991, 193, 194; Hartmut Maurer, Die Eigentumsregelung
im Einigungsvertrag, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 1992, 185; Otto Kimminich, Auswirkungen des
Einigungsvertrags auf die Eigentumsgarantie des Grundgesetzes, in: Jörn Ipsen et al. (eds.),
Verfassungsrecht im Wandel (1995), 82; Günther Felix, Vielleicht eine verdeckte
Junkerabgabe, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1995, 2697. I use the term
“expropriations” because that is the term the Court used.
64. The official name of these expropriations is: “Enteignungen auf
besatzungsrechtlicher bzw. besatzungshoheitlicher Grundlage (1945 bis 1949)”; see
Gemeinsame Erklärung der Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen vom 15 Juni 1990 (Joint
Declaration), reprinted in: Stern & Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 14, 823 et seq. (indent No.
1 on p. 823).
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Bodenreform: the expropriation of both every estate exceeding 100 hectares
(approximately 250 acres) as well as the property of everyone who was
suspected to have supported the Nazis.65 3.2 million hectares, or one third of
the available agricultural lands in the GDR, were thus expropriated.66 Peter
Quint writes that “[m]any owners were forced to leave their property on a
few days’ notice taking only the possessions that they could carry with
them.”67 The expropriated owners were not compensated in the East, but
those who made it to the West received compensatory payments from the
West German government.68 Expropriated property was distributed, mostly
in small plots of seven to nine hectares, among former landless peasants,
workers, and refugees from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. As a
result of the Bodenreform, around 550,000 people received around 2.2
million hectares of land.69
When German unification was on the horizon in early 1990,
expropriated owners of Bodenreform-property began to lobby for a return of
expropriated property.70 They were supported by the West German
government, who wanted to undo these expropriations to the extent possible.
The GDR government, on the other hand, worried about the rights of those
who had received expropriated lands. This prevented an agreement on
property matters in the Treaty on the Currency, Economic, and Social Union
of May 18, 1990.71 On June 15, 1990, however, the governments of East
and West Germany signed a “Joint Declaration on the Regulation of Open
Property Questions” (Joint Declaration),72 declaring Bodenreformexpropriations irreversible and determining that a future legislature of
unified Germany may decide on possible “governmental compensatory

65. I have taken this and the following from Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28,
125.
66. See Annex III to the UT, with annotations by Schmidt-Bleibtreu, in: Stern & SchmidtBleibtreu, supra note 14, 826.
67. Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 125.
68. The payments were based on the “Lastenausgleichsgesetz”; see Quint, The Imperfect
Union, supra note 28, 125.
69. See Annex III to the UT, with annotations by Schmidt-Bleibtreu, in: Stern & SchmidtBleibtreu, supra note 14, 826.
70. See Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 127.
71. Id.
72. Anlage III zum Einigungsvertrag, Gemeinsame Erklärung der Regierungen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Regelung
offener Vermögensfragen vom 15 Juni 1990, in: Stern & Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 14,
823 et seq.
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payments.” 73 The Joint Declaration, at the same time, determined a
fundamentally different treatment of property expropriated by the GDR
after 1949 (i.e. not Bodenreform-property), which “in principle” must
be returned to the former owners or their heirs. 74 The Joint Declaration
equally applied the principle of restitution to property taken as a result
of racial, political, religious, or ideological persecution by the Nazi
regime between 1933 and 1945 in the GDR territory.75 The Joint
Declaration was incorporated into the UT by Art. 41 (1) UT and into the
GG by Art. 143 III GG.76
Furious about this outcome, former owners of Bodenreform-property
and their heirs, respectively, appealed to the BVerfG. Art. 143 III GG, they
argued, violated, among others, the principles of human dignity and
protection of property and thus did not fit into the GG.77 They argued that
Art. 143 III GG was an “unconstitutional amendment of the GG” because it
violated Art. 79 III GG, the so-called “eternity clause,”78 by violating the
fundamental principles of human dignity and property. The plaintiffs
concluded that the West German government was obliged to return
Bodenreform-property to them.
1. The Decisions
On April 23, 1991, in Bodenreform I, the BVerfG’s First Senate held
Art. 143 III GG constitutional.79 Procedurally, the Court accepted the

73. See Joint Declaration, Indent No. 1, in: Stern & Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 14,
823.
74. See Joint Declaration, Indent No. 2 et seq., in: Stern & Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note
14, 823 et seq.
75. See Joint Declaration, id., in connection with § 1 (6) of the Act for the Settlement of
Open Property Issues (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen) (BGBl II 1990, 1159).
76. According to Art. 41 (3) UT, West Germany will not adopt any legal provisions that
contradict the Joint Declaration.
77. See BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1598.
78. Art. 79 III GG prohibits constitutional amendments that “affect” fundamental
principles of the GG. It reads: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the
Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be prohibited” (“Eine Änderung dieses
Grundgesetzes, durch welche die Gliederung des Bundes in Länder, die grundsätzliche
Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung oder die in den Artikeln 1 und 20
niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig”).
79. See BVerfG, Urteil v. 23.04.1991, 1 BvR 1170, 1174, 1175/90; NJW 1991, 1598 et
seq.
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plaintiffs’ direct appeal to the BVerfG because of the matter’s “general
importance”.80 Substantively, the Court held that Art. 143 III GG did not
violate Art. 79 III GG.
Referring to “the principles laid down in Art. 1 and 20 [GG]”, Art.
79 III GG withdraws the principles of human dignity and human rights,
the principle of equality, as well as the basic principles of the rule of law
and the social state from constitutional amendment.81 The Court argued
that at the time when Art. 143 III GG (confirming the Bodenreform) had
been adopted the former owners had not held an enforceable proprietary
position that the Bodenreform’s confirmation could have deprived them
of.82 According to the law in force on Soviet occupied territory at the
time of the Bodenreform, the expropriations were considered legal or at
least incontestable.83 The West German government, the Court argued,
was not responsible for the expropriations since its power had neither
factually nor legally extended to the territory on which the expropriations
had taken place.84 The expropriations could not be evaluated according
to the GG because the GG had not been in force at the time the
expropriations occurred.85 Even West German law did not give the
former owners an enforceable proprietary position because it accepted
expropriations undertaken by another state as lawful as long as the
expropriating state remained within the limits of its own authority
(principle of territoriality).86 The Court argued that it did not need to
decide whether the former owners had had public-international-law based
claims against the Soviet occupying force, which might have been
destroyed through Art. 143 III GG’s confirmation of the expropriations,
because such claims would have been unenforceable and thus all but
worthless.87
80. See § 90 II, 2 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG); see BVerfG, NJW 1991,
1598.
81. See BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1599.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.; the GG entered into force at the end of the day of May 23, 1949, see Art. 145 II
GG.
86. BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1599, 1600.
87. See BVerG NJW 1991, 1600. In a decision on Oct. 26, 2004, the Second Senate
confirmed the First Senate’s holding. It held that West German government could not be held
responsible for the Bodenreform-expropriations, public international law did not oblige West
Germany to return Bodenreform-property, and West German government had been entitled
to conclude that repealing Bodenreform-expropriations would have contradicted the goal of
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The Court emphasized that, based on the social-state principle (Art. 20
I GG), the West German government was obliged to balance people’s
burdens resulting from WWII. Yet, the legislature had broad discretion in
devising such a balance and was not obliged, as a matter of Art. 79 III GG,
to return property expropriated by a foreign power.88
Confirming Bodenreform-expropriations but not expropriations
undertaken before 1945 and after 1949, the Court argued, did not violate the
principle of equality as protected by Art. 79 III GG because the West German
government was entitled to assume that confirming Bodenreformexpropriations was necessary to get the Soviet Union and East Germany to
agree with German unification.89 The Court held, however, that the principle
of equality prevented the legislature from excluding all compensation for
Bodenreform-expropriations.90
When the plaintiffs asserted that the Court, in Bodenreform I, had
decided on the basis of incorrect facts, the BVerfG’s First Senate, on April
18, 1996, handed down another decision on the constitutionality of the
Bodenreform’s confirmation (Bodenreform II) in which it fully confirmed its
first decision.91
In a third decision, the Court’s First Senate decided a case brought
against provisions of a law regulating compensatory payments for victims of
Bodenreform-expropriations.92 The Court held that West Germany’s
obligation to pay compensations for financial losses that had been caused by
a government that was not bound by the GG could not be based on specific
basic rights of the GG, but could result from the GG’s social-state principle
found in Art. 20 I, 28 I GG.93 Regulation of such compensation must comply
with the rule of law and the principle of equality.94 The social-state
principle, the Court argued, required everybody to participate in burdens that
German unification; see BVerfG Beschluss v. 26.10.2004, 2 BvR 955/00, 1038/01, beckonline version, BeckRS 2004 26155, p. 15, ind. 2. For a legitimate critique of the Second
Senate’s majority opinion, see Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff’s dissent in BVerfG, id., pp. 22 et seq.
Lübbe-Wolff argues that the Second Senate’s opinion is superfluous because the First Senate
had already decided all relevant questions and the Second Senate did not reach different
conclusions.
88. See BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1600.
89. Id. at 1600, 1601.
90. Id. at 1601.
91. BVerfG, Beschluss v. 18.04.1996, 1 BvR 1452/90, 1459/90, 2031/94; NJW 1996,
1666 et seq.
92. BVerfG, Urteil v. 22.11.2000, 1 BvR 2307/94, VIZ 2001, 16 et seq.
93. BVerfG, VIZ 2001, 18.
94. Id. at 18, 19.
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resulted from a common destiny and that, more or less by chance, only
affected individual citizens. The legislature enjoys broad discretion in
compensating for such burdens and may consider its financial capacities and
future obligations, among other things, in determining the appropriate
compensation.95 Based on these principles, the Court held the contested
provisions constitutional.96
Finally, even the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) confirmed
the BVerfG’s holding that the West German government was not responsible
for expropriations undertaken in the Soviet occupation zone.97 Therefore,
the ECHR held that it had no jurisdiction to examine these expropriations’
legality.98 It further held that the former owners had had no claims at the
time of German unification that could have been protected by the European
Convention on Human Rights and that West German government might have
violated by confirming the Bodenreform-expropriations.99
2. Traditional Understanding
The traditional understanding of these decisions may be divided into
polemical, doctrinal, and political.
The decisions’ polemical critique shows the extremism with which
some authors engaged in the debate. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, for example,
calls the expropriated property “bloody booty” and the new owners
“thieves”.100 He implies that the Bodenreform-expropriations were part of a
broader Soviet strategy aiming at the economic, social, psychological, and
physical “extermination”101 of the German “Junkers”, and that “the Junker”
may well be regarded as “the Jew” of the German east under Soviet
occupation.102 Another author refers to the Bible (“thou shalt not steal”) to

95. Id. at 18.
96. BVerfG, VIZ 2001, 19 et seq.
97. ECHR, NJW 2005, 2532, 2533.
98. Id. at 2533.
99. ECHR, NJW 2005, 2533 et seq.
100. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, Das Bodenreform-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,
Analyse und Kritik, in Stern, infra note 109, 3.
101. He actually uses the word “Vernichtung”, see Vitzthum, supra note 100, 14.
102. Id.; in an attempt to distance himself from his own statement, Vitzthum argues that
his comparison of the extermination of “the Junkers” with the extermination of “the Jews”
would be “much too daring” (“viel zu gewagt”). Another author who eagerly compares the
Bodenreform-expropriations with measures of the Nazi regime is Walter Leisner, Das
Bodenreform-Urteil
des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts
Kriegsfolgeund
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attack the constitutionality of the compensation rules and the BVerfG’s
decision.103
Many authors deny that the Bodenreform’s confirmation was a conditio
sine qua non for German unification.104 They doubt the Soviet Union’s
insistence on the expropriations’ confirmation as a prerequisite for its
acceptance of German unification.105 Some even accuse the West German
government of lying to the Court about the Soviet Union’s insistence on the
Bodenreform’s indefeasibility.106 Another argument is that the GDR was
not powerful enough to impose conditions on West Germany.107 Yet, after
trying to undermine the factual basis for the government’s case, the authors
often imply that, from a constitutional point of view, the Court was
eventually right to defer to the government’s decision to accept the
Bodenreform’s confirmation.108 Some argue the Court should have fully and
openly based its decisions on the principle of judicial self-restraint since that
would have increased the decisions’ pacifying effect.109
Some authors criticize the Court for not sufficiently specifying and
applying Art. 79 III GG’s requirements and limits in general and the
principles of human dignity (Art. 1 I GG) and equality (Art. 3 I GG) in
particular. 110 One author argues that the Bodenreform-expropriations were
acts of arbitrariness, inhumanity, and brutality and, as such, violated the
human-dignity core inherent in the protection of property.111 Having thus
turned the taking of property into a violation of the principle of human
dignity, the argument considers the Bodenreform-expropriations violations

Eigentumsentscheidung, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1991, 1569 and id.,
Verfassungswidriges Verfassungsrecht, Nach dem Bodenreform-Urteil des BVerfG, Die
Öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV) 1992, 435.
103. Klaus Märker, Der Staatsräson verpflichtet! Zur Entscheidung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts über die Verfassungsmäßighkeit des Entschädigungs - und
Ausgleichsleistungsgesetzes, Zeitschrift für Vermögens- und Immobilienrecht (VIZ) 2001,
233, 238.
104. See, for example, Kimminich, supra note 63, 84 et seq. with further references.
105. Id.; Maurer, supra note 63, 189.
106. Felix, supra note 63, 2697 et seq.
107. See Maurer, supra note 63, 189 note 35; Johannes Wasmuth, Restitutionsausschluss
und Willkürverbot, Deutsch-Deutsche Rechtszeitschrift (DtZ) 1993, 335.
108. See Vitzthum, supra note 100, 11.
109. Stern commenting on Vitzthum, in: Klaus Stern (ed.), Deutsche Wiedervereinigung,
Band II, Zur Wiederherstellung der inneren Einheit, Teil 1, Vermögensfragen öffentlicher
Dienst, Universitäten (1992), 36.
110. Maurer, supra note 63, 190 et seq.; Vitzthum, supra note 100, 13.
111. Vitzthum, supra note 100, 13 et seq.
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of Art. 1 I GG and thus of Art. 79 III GG. As regards the principle of equality,
it is argued that neither the Soviet Union’s nor the GDR’s insistence on the
Bodenreform’s confirmation suffice as a good reason for the different
treatment of Bodenreform-expropriations on the one hand and expropriations
before 1945 and after 1949 on the other.112 Both arguments result in the new
Art. 143 III GG’s unconstitutionality.
Other authors consider the Bodenreform a violation of public
international law.113 Under the Hague Convention, they argue, the USSR
was not authorized to take private property in occupied Germany.114 They
conclude that the West German government was obliged to return the
expropriated lands to the former owners.115
Finally there are authors who anticipated and approve of the Court’s
doctrinal arguments.116 In particular, they argue that Art. 79 III GG in
connection with the basic principles of human dignity and the rule of law do
not oblige West Germany to undo property violations by other states.117
They say, moreover, that the West German government was constitutionally
entitled to treat Bodenreform-expropriations and expropriations before 1945
and after 1949 differently because the government stayed within the limits
of its broad discretion in political questions when it assumed that confirming
the Bodenreform was necessary to achieve German unification.118
Other authors characterize the Court’s decisions as acts of judicial
politics. Quint, for example, writes, “. . . the Constitutional Court sought to
settle one of the most important constitutional and political questions arising
from unification. In so doing, the Court seemed to employ a mediating
technique in which it chose no clear winners or losers but rather sought to
create a political structure that embodied a compromise.”119 Others accuse
the Court of trying to protect state finances.120

112. Maurer, supra note 63, 190 et seq.
113. See, for example, Kimminich, supra note 63, 80; Wasmuth, supra note 107, 334 et
seq. with further references; von der Beck, 247 et seq.
114. Otto Kimminich, Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozess der Wiedervereinigung: Zur
Bestandskraft der agrarischen Bodenrechtsordnung der DDR (1990), 76, 77.
115. Id. at 77.
116. Papier, supra note 63, 193 et seq. with further references; Hans Jürgen Papier, in
Theodor Maunz & Günther Dürig, Grundgesetz, Art. 14 paras. 273-277.
117. Papier, supra note 63, 196.
118. Papier, supra note 63, 196, 197.
119. Quint, supra note 28, 138.
120. Märker, supra note 103, 234, 236, 241; Karl Doehring & Peter Ruess, Die
Entscheidung des BVerfG zur Entschädigung von Opfern der Bodenreform im Lichte der
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I think the traditional understanding is unable to convincingly explain
the Court’s decisions. The doctrinal understanding, be it critical or
affirmative of the Court’s decisions, appears too technical and too much
guided by the desired outcome. The Court’s holding that West Germany was
not responsible for the Bodenreform since its power had not extended to the
territory in which the expropriations had taken place is a case in point. If one
would focus not on the expropriations but instead on the Bodenreform’s
confirmation, West Germany was responsible. It was the West German
government who decided to confirm these expropriations. So, would it have
been indefensible to argue that the Bodenreform’s confirmation violated Art.
79 III GG because it corroborated a situation that had been brought about by
fundamental human rights violations? Another example is the Court’s
holding that the West German government could assume that the USSR and
the GDR had insisted on the expropriations’ confirmation as a condition for
German unification. In fact, official statements on this matter are
contradictory.121 Gorbachev, for example, said that “. . . [o]n my level as
President of the USSR, that question was not dealt with, and neither can it
be said that there was an alternative: either the restitution or the Big
Treaty.”122 Did the Court really examine whether or not the West German
government had been evidently wrong to assume that the Soviet Union had
insisted on the expropriations’ confirmation? Wouldn’t the Court have had
to hear Gorbachev as a witness in order to verify Staatssekretär Dr. Kastrup’s
statement that the Soviet Union would have refused to sign the Two-plusFour Treaty without a prior confirmation of the Bodenreform by West
Germany?123 These examples suffice to show that, based on doctrinal
arguments, the Court might well have come out the other way.
So, why did the Court decide as it did? Judicial politics after all? The
attempt to find a political middle ground to facilitate unification and give
East Germans the feeling that at least some of their concerns were taken into
account? Another attempt to bolster the Court’s popularity and reaffirm its

EMRK – Rechtssicherheit oder mit Sicherheit Unrecht?, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
(NJW) 2001, 640, 642, all commenting on the Court’s EALG decision of Nov. 22, 2000.
121. See Maurer, supra note 63, 189; Felix, supra note 63, 2697 et seq.; Kimminich, supra
note, 84 et seq.
122. That was Gorbachev’s answer on July 5, 1994, to a question by the Oxford historian
Prof. Norman Stone whether it “. . . is true or not that the USSR, during the negotiations over
German unification, has made the prohibition of a restitution (a return of property that was
confiscated during that time [1945-1949]) an unalterable condition? Is it true that you in
particular insisted on the prohibition of such restitutions in the future?”, quoted in: Felix,
supra note 63, 2697, 2698.
123. See BVerfG, NJW 1996, 1666, 1670.
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institutional standing as a voice of reason? To assume that would be giving
up too quickly on the possibility to explain the Court’s decisions in terms of
constitutional interpretation.
The traditional understanding’s problem is that, even though some of
its arguments take history into account, it ignores the 1989 Revolution’s
impact on unified Germany’s constitutional law. In what follows I will argue
that the Court’s decisions can only be understood once one takes into account
that, by the time the Court decided, there had been a successful revolution in
East Germany, the Bodenreform’s confirmation had been an important
revolutionary achievement, and the UT had transferred this achievement to
unified Germany, where the institutions were now faced with the challenge
of integrating it into the existing structures of West German constitutional
law. Unified Germany’s federal legislature had tried to meet this challenge
by adopting Art. 143 III GG, but the Court saw that a proper integration of
Art. 143 III GG into the existing constitutional order required the
compensation of former owners.
3. My understanding: the decisions as acts of integration
My thesis is that the Court’s Bodenreform decisions are more
realistically and meaningfully understood, not as acts of doctrinalism or
judicial politics, but as acts of constitutional interpretation with which the
BVerfG self-consciously confronted the revolutionary achievement of
confirming the Bodenreform and tried to integrate it into existing structures
of West German constitutional law.
During the 1960s most of the Bodenreform-lands had been
concentrated in so-called LPGs,124 even though, formally, individual farmers
and members of the LPGs had remained owners of these lands. The owners’
right to dispose of this property, however, had been strongly limited.125 As
a result of the 1989 Revolution, the lands were turned back into “real” private
property by repealing all former limitations and declaring the GDR Civil
Code applicable.126 When the GDR was headed towards German

124. Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften (Farmers’ Cooperatives).
125. The property was termed “Working Property” (“Arbeitseigentum”) and could, for
example, not be sold but, under certain conditions, be passed on to heirs. For details, see
Steffen Siewert, Zum Eigentum an den Bodenreform-Grundstücken, Neue Justiz (NJ) 1992,
155 et seq.
126. See §1 Gesetz über die Rechte der Eigentümer von Grundstücken aus der
Bodenreform v. 06.03.1990 (GBl. DDR I 1990, 134); see also Dieter Dörr, EMRK Bodenreform, Report on the EGMR’s decision (Section III.), Urteil vom 22.01.2004 -

1 - FINAL - Jaggi - Revolutionary Reform in German .docx

194

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

6/5/2018 11:41 AM

[Vol. 41:3

unification, it had quickly become clear the people’s Bodenreform-property
would soon be challenged by the former owners, mostly West Germans. The
East Germans’ call for protection of property had therefore increasingly
included a call for confirming the Bodenreform. This call had caused
institutional reactions. Wolfgang Ullman, member of an early reformgovernment in the GDR (the so-called Modrow “government of national
responsibility”), said that
as a member of the [Modrow] government, I had to consider
how we would handle the issues that resulted from World War
II. I was of the opinion that one consideration must be that certain
things would not be undone. For me, one of these things had
always been the Bodenreform and the expropriation of groups in
society that had contributed very significantly to Hitler’s seizure
of power and to the preparation of World War II.127
Ullmann himself, a prominent representative of the citizens’ movement,
had urged the Modrow government to ask the Soviet Union to insist on the
irreversibility of Bodenreform-expropriations during the Two-Plus-FourTreaty negotiations.128 The Modrow government, says Ullmann, acted in
accordance with his request.129
A further institutional reaction to, and legal manifestation of, the East
Germans’ call for the protection of Bodenreform-property was an early draft
constitution which had declared the Bodenreform “inviolable.” The goal had
been “to preserve social peace and to secure vested social rights” of GDR
citizens.130 Ulrich Preuß, a West German law professor advising the
revolutionaries, said the provision must be considered “a gesture of selfconfidence [by the East Germans], which West Germany should wisely
respect.”131 Statements by the first freely elected GDR government also
reflect the East Germans’ will regarding Bodenreform. Prime Minister De
Maiziere argued vigorously in favor of confirming the Bodenreform in order
46720/99, 72203/01, 7255/01 (Jahn u.a./Deutschland), Juristische Schulung (JuS) 2004, 808
et seq.
127. Wolfgang Ullmann, Verfassung und Parlament, 23 (1992).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Klaus Michael Rogner, Der Verfassungsentwurf des Zentralen Runden Tisches
der DDR, 98 (1993).
131. Ulrich Preuß, Auf der Suche nach der Zivilgesellschaft, in: Bernd Guggenberg &
Tine Stein (eds.), Die Verfassungsdiskussion im Jahr der Deutschen Einheit, 365, 366 (1991).
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to prevent social unrest in the GDR after unification.132 The first freely
elected East German parliament agreed.133
The West German government had respected the East Germans’ will in
both the Joint Declaration of June 15, 1990, and in the UT. The West German
legislature had implemented that will with the necessary 2/3 majority in the
new Art. 143 III GG.
When considerable arguments were made that Art. 143 III GG did not
fit into the GG, it became the BVerfG’s task to properly integrate the
revolutionary achievement into the existing constitutional order under the
GG.
The Court’s basis for integration was Art. 79 III GG. Since the
Bodenreform’s confirmation had been manifested in a constitutional
amendment (Art. 143 III GG), the question of whether or not it fit into the
GG had to be examined on the basis of the GG’s most fundamental principles
as listed in Art. 79 III GG. According to Art. 79 III GG, constitutional
amendments must not violate these core principles.
Within its Art. 79 III GG examination, the Court self-consciously refers
to the respect that West Germany owes to the revolutionaries’ will and makes
this a core argument for Art. 143 III GG’s integration into the existing
constitutional order under the GG. The Court argues that:
If the unity should be realized in an orderly fashion and be
accepted by the people of the GDR as a result of their selfdetermination, the West German government, in the
negotiations, had to take seriously the will of the first
democratically elected representation of the [GDR] people and
the government elected by it. To ignore their wishes would, in
any case, have contradicted the respect that West Germany owed
to the people in the GDR and could have considerably
endangered the orderly process of reunification.134
The argument shows that the factor requiring, and thus constitutionally
justifying, the Bodenreform’s confirmation was neither the GDR’s
132. Government Declaration, supra note 54, pp. 8, 18; BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1601;
BVerfG, NJW 1996, 1669; supra, 147.
133. See Protocol of the 15th Meeting of the Volkskammer on 17.06.1990, reprinted in:
Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 179 et seq., petition by Abg. Holz (DBD/DFD) on
p. 199, de Maiziere’s response on pp. 202 et seq., and finally the VK’s decision to refrain
from writing the confirmation of the Bodenreform-expropriations into the VGG on p. 203.
134. BVerfG, NJW 1996, 1668, 1669 (my italics).
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contractual bargaining power nor its ability to prevent unification. It was “the
respect that West Germany owed to the people in the GDR”. Disrespect of
that will might have reactivated the revolutionary people and might have
developed into “social dynamite of the first order” endangering German
unification.135
Finally, the Court activates the GG’s core principles, i.e., the socialstate principle, the rule of law, and the principle of equality, in order to
integrate the East Germans’ will to confirm the Bodenreform into the
existing constitutional order under the GG. Based on these core principles,
the Court develops a constitutional government obligation to provide for
compensatory payments to former owners of Bodenreform property. This
obligation to compensate former owners is a means to fit the Bodenreform’s
confirmation into the GG.

II. Gender Equality
Another hotly debated topic during the 1989 Revolution and the process
of German unification was gender equality. As I have shown, individual
empowerment through, among others, the establishment of real-social
instead of only formal-legal equality for women was an important
revolutionary achievement.136 This achievement was transferred to unified
Germany through Art. 5 UT and Art. 31 (1) UT, according to which unified
Germany’s legislature should further develop legislation facilitating the
equal protection of men and women.137 All new state constitutions include
provisions explicitly establishing an active government obligation to make
gender equality a social reality.138 On this basis, in 1994 the GVK proposed,
and unified Germany’s legislature adopted, a new sentence 2 to Art. 3 II GG
stating that the state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights
for women and men and take steps to eliminate existing disadvantages.139
Interestingly, most authors argue that the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG did not
bring any change. Scholz, for example, writes that the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG

135. Id. at 1669.
136. See Ackerman, supra 2, at 707.
137. See Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 para. 58.
138. See Constitutions of Brandenburg, Art. 12 III, 48 III, 2; Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania, Art. 13; Saxony, Art. 8; Saxony-Anhalt, Art. 34; Thuringia, Art. 2 II; and Berlin,
Art. 10 III.
139. See supra, 214.
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is only a “clarification” of what the BVerfG had already decided.140 Even
the Court itself, in Feuerwehrabgabe,141 calls the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG an
explicit clarification of what it had already decided in Nachtarbeit in
1992.142 Does that mean the Court already knew in 1992 what the legislature
would do in 1994? What exactly did the Court say in 1992?
In Nachtarbeit143 the Court, for the first time, said that according to Art.
3 II GG, the legislature was not only authorized but constitutionally obliged
to realize gender equality as a fact of social reality.144 Prior to that decision,
e.g. in Altersruhegeld (1987), the Court had considered the legislature
merely authorized to realize gender equality and had explicitly left open
whether the government was also obliged to do so.145 So, the real change
seems to have taken place in 1992: from the government’s constitutional
authorization to realize gender equality to its constitutional obligation to do
so. If that is true, the question is: why did the Court change its approach to
gender equality? And why already in 1992 and not after the GG had been
amended in 1994?
There are authors who simply deny any change in the Court’s approach
to gender equality in 1992. Michael Sachs, for example, argues that the
Court’s statement on Art. 3 II GG in Nachtarbeit merely summarized its
former holdings.146 Others, while more exact and differentiating in their
reading of what the Court said in 1992, still do not answer what exactly
changed and why.147
My thesis is twofold: (i) the Court’s approach to gender equality
changed profoundly in 1992; and (ii) the reason for this change is the 1989
Revolution, its constitutional achievement with respect to gender equality,
and the Court’s attempt to integrate this achievement into the existing
constitutional order under the GG. I will argue that, when the Court decided

140. Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG para. 71.
141. BVerfG Beschluss v. 24.01.1995, 1 BvL 18/93, 1 BvL 5/94, 1 BvL 6/94, 1 BvL 7/94,
1 BvR 403/94, 1 BvR 569/94, BVerfGE 92, 91-122.
142. BVerfGE 92, 91, juris-version, rec. 68.
143. BVerfG Urteil v. 28.01.1992, 1 BvR 1025/82, 1 BvL 16/83, 1 BvL 10/91, BVerfGE
85, 191-214.
144. BVerfGE 85, 191, juris-version, rec. 53.
145. BVerfG Beschluss v. 28.01.1987, 1 BvR 455/82, BVerfGE 74, 163-182, jurisversion, rec. 45, 46.
146. Michael Sachs, Anmerkung zum BVerfG Urteil v. 28.01.1992, Juristische Schulung
(JuS) (1992) 876.
147. See Manfred Löwisch, Anmerkung zum BverfG Urteil v. 28.01.1992, Juristenzeitung
(JZ) (1992) 917 et seq.
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Altersruhegeld in 1987, it was still able to leave open whether or not the
government was constitutionally obliged to realize gender equality. In 1987,
the Court still lived in the old, strongly conservative West Germany. West
Germany’s constitutional order was determined by a, generally, formal-legal
approach to gender equality under which authorizing the legislature to
compensate women for past discrimination was the most the Court
considered itself authorized to do. In 1992 that was no longer the case
because a profound change had taken place in 1989/1990. The 1989
Revolution had demanded, among other things, a constitutional government
obligation to realize gender equality.148 Unified Germany’s legislature,
whom Art. 5 and Art. 31 (1) UT had obliged to “further develop” the law on
gender equality, was politically deadlocked.149 In this situation, it was the
Court who felt obliged to take on the issue. It did so in an obiter dictum in
Nachtarbeit, where it stated what it considered to be the 1989 Revolution’s
impact on unified Germany’s constitutional law. This explains why the
Court, without possessing a crystal ball, was able to say in 1992 what the
legislature would add to the GG only in 1994.
In what follows, I will analyze the change in the Court’s approach to
gender equality from 1987 to 1992, outline the traditional understanding of
that change, and then explain my own understanding.

1. The Decisions: Altersruhegeld (1987) and Nachtarbeit
(1992)
Prior to 1987, the Court’s approach to gender equality based on Art. 3
II, III GG was, generally, a formal one.150 As long as an unequal treatment
was formulated in gender-neutral terms, it was generally considered
constitutional. If not, it was generally considered unconstitutional, unless
objective biological or functional differences between the sexes justified the

148. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 178 et seq.
149. See supra, pp. 6 et seq.
150. Ute Sacksofsky, Das Grundrecht auf Gleichberechtigung, Eine rechtsdogmatische
Untersuchung zu Artikel 3 Abs. 2 des Grundgesetzes, 26 et seq. (1991); Claudia EckertzHöfer, in Erhard Denninger et al. (eds.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Reihe Alternativkommentare, Band 1, Art. 3 Abs. 2, 3 paras. 26 et seq. (3rd ed.
2001); Kerstin Schweizer, Der Gleichberechtigungssatz - Neue Form, alter Inhalt?,110 et seq.
(1998); for the few exceptions to this principle, see Sacksofsky, id., 95 et seq. and Schweizer,
id., 112; for an overview of adjudication and literature, see Sacksofsky, id., 23 et seq. and 101
et seq.
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unequal treatment.151 The Court later modified this formula, so that genderbased differentiations were justified if they were indispensable to solve
problems that, according to their nature, could only occur with either men or
women.152 Applying this formula, the Court focused on making sure that
the law was facially gender neutral. The Court was, generally, not concerned
about laws that were facially gender neutral but still had discriminatory
effects in practice.153 Despite the interpretive rule that provisions with
different texts must not be assumed to have identical meaning, both the
BVerfG and most authors interpreted Art. 3 II GG as merely confirming the
prohibition of gender discrimination stated in Art. 3 III GG154.
The Court’s formal approach to gender equality has been criticized for
a long time. As early as 1974, it was F.J. Säcker who argued that Art. 3 II
GG in combination with the social-state clause imposed a government
obligation to adopt necessary measures to make equality of women a social
reality.155 Karl Heinrich Friauf stated in 1981 that Art. 3 II GG, interpreted
in the light of the social-state principle, obliged the government to actively
further equality for women.156 However, led by Manfred Löwisch, most
authors insisted that Art. 3 II GG merely stipulated formal-legal equality.157
Accordingly, Art. 3 II GG only prohibited gender-based legal
differentiations without including an order to actively promote women’s real
emancipation.158 Based on this principle, many authors in the 1980s’
considered structural social discrimination against women, such as unequal
distribution of work in the family, a purely private matter with which
151. That had been the standard test since BVerfGE 3, 225, 242; 52,369, 374; 63, 181,
194; 68, 384, 390; 71, 224, 229; see Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 27; Schweizer,
supra note 150, 111.
152. Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 31.
153. Schweizer, supra note 150, 112; Sacksofsky, supra note 150, 27.
154. Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, paras. 3 and 26; Sacksofsky, supra note 24 and 150;
Schweizer, supra note 110 and 150; Art. 3 II GG read: “Men and women shall have equal
rights”; Art. 3 III GG read: “No person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, . . . .”
155. F.J. Säcker, Referat auf dem 50. Deutschen Juristentag zum Thema: Welche
rechtlichen Massnahmen sind vordringlich, um die tatsächliche Gleichstellung der Frauen mit
den Männern im Arbeitsleben zu gewährleisten?, Verhandlungen des 50. Deutschen
Juristentages, 1974, Band II, L 9, p. 25.
156. Karl Heinrich Friauf, Gleichberechtigung der Frau als Verfassungsauftrag,
Rechtsgutachten erstattet im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums des Innern, 29 (1981).
157. Manfred Löwisch, Referat auf dem 50, Deutschen Juristentag zum Thema: Welche
rechtlichen Massnahmen sind vordringlich, um die tatsächliche Gleichstellung der Frauen mit
den Männern im Arbeitsleben zu gewährleisten?, Verhandlungen des 50. Deutschen
Juristentages, 1974, Band. I, D 11, p. 42; Schweizer, supra note 150, 116.
158. Id.
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government must not interfere.159
The Court’s view of Art. 3 II GG started to change in 1987 with
Altersruhegeld. Here, for the first time, the Court explicitly attributed
constitutional relevance not only to legal but also to factual, social
discrimination against women.160 The Court examined under Art. 3 II GG a
legal provision according to which women were entitled to pensions from
the statutory pension insurance upon their 60s birthday, while men needed
to be older.161 The Court held the provision constitutional and stated that the
legislature was constitutionally authorized to compensate women in a
generalizing way162 for such factual discriminations that could be traced
back to biological differences.163 Such compensatory measures, the Court
argued, could not be considered gender-based discrimination.164 Reasons
that may justify women’s preferential treatment, according to the Court,
were social factors that typically disadvantaged women, such as women’s
dual burden of child-raising and professional work, educational
disadvantages, lower salaries, and fewer career opportunities. All these
factors, the Court argued, were typically rooted in traditional perceptions of
women as mothers, which could be traced back to biological differences.165
In the same decision, the Court took up another question that it had not
decided previously: was the legislature constitutionally not only authorized
but obliged to actively generate the prerequisites for “factual gender
equality”?166 The Court emphasized that, so far, the principle of gender
equality had been applied mainly as an individual defense against
discriminations by the government. Explicitly referring to Friauf’s 1981
study, the Court pointed out that it had recently been discussed whether Art.
3 II GG also established a positive government obligation to actively

159. See Schweizer, supra note 150, 117, 118 with further references; note the similar
differentiation between state and society in this argument and in the majority’s argument in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
160. So, too, Juliane Kokott, Zur Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau - Deutsches
Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
(NJW) 1995, 1050, 1054; Sacksofsky, supra note 150, 74 et seq.; Schweizer, supra note 150,
113; Christine Fuchsloch, Das Verbot der mittelbaren Geschlechtsdiskriminierung,
Ableitung,
Analyse
und
exemplarische
Anwendung
auf
staatliche
Berufsausbildungsförderung, 77 et seq. (1995).
161. BVerfGE 74, 163, juris-version, rec. 1.
162. That means without the need of evidence for discrimination in a specific case.
163. BVerfGE 74, 163, juris-version, rec. 46; Schweizer, supra note 150, 113.
164. Id.
165. BVerfGE 74, 163, juris-version, rec. 49.
166. Id. at rec. 46.
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promote the realization of gender equality.167 Yet, the Court explicitly left
the question open because its decision did not depend upon it.168
The next time the Court took up the question was in 1992 in
Nachtarbeit. And despite the fact that the Court’s decision, again, did not
depend upon it, the Court nonetheless decided to answer the question in an
obiter dictum. The Court stated that Art. 3 II GG’s additional content, i.e.,
the content that went beyond the prohibition of gender discrimination that
was already stated in Art. 3 III GG, was “that it postulates an order to equal
protection and it expands this order to apply also to social reality.”169 What
exactly does that mean? Some authors argue, as I have mentioned before,
that the Court only summarized what it had already said in Altersruhegeld
and earlier decisions.170 Others think the Court “only assigned to the
legislature a set of questions and considerations to decide on.”171 If that was
true there would be no need to examine why the Court did what it did. A
mere summary of what had already been said before or the assignment to the
legislature of a set of questions and considerations would not justify further
analysis.
I think these authors are wrong. Prior to Nachtarbeit the Court had
never said that Art. 3 II GG’s additional content was “an order to equal
protection” and an expansion of that order to include “social reality.” The
decisions the Court cited in Nachtarbeit do not contain such statements and
none of them says anything about a government obligation to actively realize
gender equality.
Moreover, in a case decided later that year
(Kindererziehungszeiten, decided on July 7, 1992),172 the Court explicitly
clarified what it had meant in Nachtarbeit with the expression “order to
gender equality” was a constitutional government obligation to actively realize

167. Id. at rec. 45.
168. Id. at rec. 46.
169. BVerfGE 85, 191, juris-version, rec. 53; the original reads: “Der über das
Diskriminierungsverbot des Art. 3 Abs. 3 GG hinausreichende Regelungsgehalt von Art. 3
Abs. 2 GG besteht darin, daß er ein Gleichberechtigungsgebot aufstellt und dieses auch auf
die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit erstreckt.“
170. Sachs, supra note 146, 876; see supra, 33; this view must be distinguished from, for
example, Di Fabio’s view, according to which a “profound and systematically highly
important change in the interpretation of basic rights” has occurred, but who holds this change
to be deeply wrong; see Udo Di Fabio, Die Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau, Archiv des
öffentlichen Rechts (AöR) 1997, 404, 408 et seq., 441 et seq.
171. Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG para. 64.
172. BVerfG Urteil v. 07.07.1992, 1 BvL 51/86, 1 BvL 50/87, 1 BvR 873/90, 1 BvR
761/91, BVerfGE 87, 1-48.
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gender equality.173 It is undisputed that the Court had never said anything like
that before Nachtarbeit.174
The decision shows that the argument according to which the Court did
not decide on a government obligation to realize gender equality but, by way
of obiter dictum, only assigned questions and considerations to the
legislature175 is only partly true. To be sure, the Court used an obiter dictum
to establish the new government obligation, which was thus not part of the
holding in the technical sense. Nonetheless, the Court stated a clear
government obligation and did not merely “assign a set of questions and
considerations”. This can no longer be doubted, at least since the Court
explicitly confirmed it in Erziehungszeiten.176
It can thus safely be said that Nachtarbeit profoundly changed the
Court’s interpretation of Art. 3 II GG by reading into it, for the first time, a
government obligation to actively realize gender equality.177
The remaining question is: why did the Court do that? Unfortunately,
the Court does not explain itself. It generated its obiter dictum on the new
meaning of Art. 3 II GG in Nachtarbeit out of thin air. In what follows I will
therefore first present and criticize the traditional understanding of the
change in order to then present my own view.

2.Traditional Understanding
The traditional understanding can be divided into doctrinal and judicialpolitics arguments.
The traditional doctrinal view argues that, like every basic right, Art. 3
II GG has an objective value core, which, in connection with the social-state

173. The Court explicitly cited Nachtarbeit in support of a statement according to which
“the clearly higher concernment of women causes the legislature’s obligation [Pflicht]
emanating from Art. 3 II GG to work towards an equalization of the living conditions of
women and men”; see BVerfGE 87, 1, juris-version, rec. 140 (my italics).
174. Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Bremen in 1987 had concluded from the BVerfG’s
holdings that Art. 3 II GG comprised not only an individual defensive right but also an
“objective value decision” (“objektive Wertentscheidung”) and an “objective value measure”
(“objektiver Wertmaßstab”), respectively; see VG Bremen, NJW 1988, 3224 et seq., 3225;
not even the VG Bremen, however, asserted that the BVerfG had explicitly stated a
constitutional obligation of the state to actively realize gender equality.
175. Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG para. 64.
176. BVerGE 87, 1, juris-version, rec. 140.
177. This conclusion is shared, for example, by Schweizer, supra note 150, 114; and Di
Fabio, supra note 170, 408 et seq., 441.
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principle, establishes a government obligation to actively realize gender
equality, not just as formal-legal equality but as a fact of social reality.178
Säcker and Friauf already presented this argument in the 1970s and early
1980s.179 However, regardless of what one thinks of it, it does not answer
the question of why the Court changed its view in 1992. If one believes in
the doctrinal explanation, why did it take the Court until 1992 to follow it?
Why didn’t the Court apply it in 1987, when it decided Altersruhegeld and
had already brought up the question only to leave it open? If one does not
believe in the doctrinal explanation, then why did the Court bring about the
change in 1992? What had happened between 1987 and 1992?
A traditional judicial-politics argument for the Court’s change is that
the change was overdue because the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
several EC Directives had been saying for a long time that the principle of
gender equality authorized state measures to actively realize gender
equality.180 West Germany had signed several public international law
agreements that imposed obligations on signatory states to realize gender
equality and adopt measures of affirmative action to make up for
disadvantages suffered by women as a result of gender discrimination.181
Several EU Directives, ECJ decisions, and the EU Treaty itself have required
positive government measures to make gender equality a social reality.182
Some authors argue that EU law decisively influenced the development of
gender equality in West Germany.183 But again, even if one would follow
this argument, the question remains: why did the Court not follow these leads
prior to 1992?
Other authors emphasize the BVerfG’s role as a moral and political
leader in West Germany. The Court, the argument goes, has been an engine
of gender equality in West Germany and far ahead of a Zeitgeist that has
been dominated by traditional perceptions of gen
der roles.184 Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt, for example, speculates
178. See, for example, Friauf, supra notes 28, 29, and 156.
179. See supra, p. 35 et seq.
180. See Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, paras. 20 et seq.; Schweizer, supra note 150, 229
et seq.
181. For details, see Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 19.
182. For details, see id. paras. 20 et seq.
183. Explicitly Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 23.
184. Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Frauen, in:
Robert Christian van Ooyen & Martin Möllers (eds.), Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im
politischen System, 257 (2006).
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about the reasons for the Court’s moral and political leadership and examines
the extent to which female justices of the BVerfG may have guided the Court
towards promoting gender equality.185 Even though Hohmann-Dennhardt
concedes the difficulty of determining which justice has exercised what
influence in specific decisions, she still tries to show how female justices of
the BVerfG have contributed to the Court’s adjudication on gender
equality.186
None of these arguments sufficiently considers constitutional
interpretation to explain the change. None of them even mentions the 1989
Revolution and its possible implications for unified Germany’s
constitutional law in general and the development of gender equality in
particular. This is even more surprising in the light of the fact that two
historical events took place in Germany between 1987 (Altersruhegeld) and
1992 (Nachtarbeit), the 1989 Revolution and the 1990 Unification. Pure
coincidence? I want to argue otherwise.
3. My Understanding: Nachtarbeit as an act of integration
In 1992, the Court found itself in a peculiar situation. In 1987, it could
still afford to leave open the question of whether there was a constitutional
government obligation to realize gender equality. The question had been an
issue since the mid-70s, but nothing of constitutional importance had
materialized. The Court had been practicing its traditional formal-legal
approach to gender equality since the 1950s, most authors had agreed, and
the changes that this approach had necessitated in the field of family law had
been upsetting enough for many a staunch West German traditionalists.
The dominant opinion on gender equality had always been very
conservative in West Germany. Heated discussions and a popular movement
had been necessary to even get the principle of gender equality into the GG
in 1949 in the first place.187 An early draft of the GG had not contained a
provision for gender equality, and the first proposal by the Parliamentarian
Council had limited gender equality to equal political rights and obligations.
Massive pressure by feminist groups and others had been necessary to force
the simple statement “men and women have equal rights” into the GG.188

185. See Hohmann-Dennhardt, id., 257 et seq.
186. Id. at 258 et seq.
187. See Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 5; Kokott, supra note 160, 1050.
188. Art. 3 II GG old version; for this and the following; see Eckertz-Höfer, supra note
150, para. 5; Kokott, supra note 160, 1050.
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The dominant opinion at the time had sharply distinguished between state
and society and had argued that gender equality in the social sphere was none
of the government’s business. Whether women should pursue professional
careers, or become housewives the argument went, was exclusively for the
family to decide. Government, according to this view, was only authorized
and obliged to deal with legal and political equality. Wolfgang Abendroth
writes that it took the BVerfG189 until 1959 to enforce the application of Art.
3 II GG in the area of family law against a majority in the Bundestag and
against the German Supreme Court (BGH).190 Met with so much resistance,
the BVerfG had already taken a courageous step in 1987 by holding the
legislature authorized to adopt laws that compensated women for
discriminatory disadvantages. To go even further and establish a
government obligation to realize gender equality as a fact of social reality
did not seem viable in 1987.
The situation had changed fundamentally by 1992. A successful
revolution had taken place in East Germany in the fall of 1989. One of the
revolutionaries’ claims had been the establishment of real gender equality
through active government intervention. More generally, the principle of
individual empowerment, i.e., a constitutional government obligation to
actively develop a social environment in which constitutional individual
rights can become a social reality for everyone instead of remaining only
formal-legal rights, had been at the heart of the Revolution’s constitutional
agenda. The citizens’ movements had emphasized the importance of women
for the Revolution’s success and had demanded the adoption of real equality
for women as an explicit constitutional principle.191 The people in the streets
had agreed and had expressed this agreement, for example, in a poll in which
they held the GDR to be superior to West Germany when it comes to equal
protection of women.192 The GDR Constitution of 1968/1974 had
guaranteed equal treatment of the sexes in all areas of social, political, and
personal life and had made the advancement of women a government
obligation.193 Yet, when it came to social reality, women had been victims
of discrimination in the GDR as well. Even though there had been many
women with professional careers, for example, women had been strongly
underrepresented in important leadership positions in business, government,
189. BVerfGE 10, 59, decided on 29. July 1959.
190. See Wolfgang Abenroth, Das Grundgesetz, Eine Einführung in seine politischen
Probleme, 66 (3rd ed. 1972).
191. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 586 et seq.
192. See Jaggi, supra note 1, 70.
193. See Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 6.
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and academics.194 Against this background, the revolutionaries had
demanded real gender equality by including in the Social Charter the equal
treatment of the sexes, comprehensive provision of day care, equal
representation of men and women in all sectors of professional life, and a
woman’s right to abortion.195 The draft of a new constitution for the GDR
had established a government obligation to make gender equality a social
reality by stating in Art. 3 (2) that the state is obliged to work towards equal
treatment196 of women in the profession and in public life, in education and
vocational training, in the family, and in social security.197 Finally, the first
freely elected government in East Germany had emphasized the importance
of realizing equal treatment of women in the professional world as well as in
society in general.198 These had been clear statements demanding a
constitutional government obligation to actively realize gender equality.
This demand had been transferred to unified Germany by several
means. Art. 5 UT had provided that unified Germany’s legislature shall deal
with questions of amending the GG that had been raised by German
unification. Since the question of a constitutional government obligation to
realize gender equality had been viewed differently in the post-revolutionary
GDR on the one hand and in West Germany on the other, it had been an
important question raised by unification.199 Art. 5 UT had thus transferred
the topic as well as the East Germans’ opinion on it to unified Germany. Art.
31 (1) UT had specified the transfer by postulating that unified Germany’s
legislature must further develop the law on gender equality.200 Finally, all
new state constitutions contained an explicit government obligation to
194. See Pamela Heß, Geschlechterkonstruktionen nach der Wende, Auf dem Weg einer
gemeinsamen Politischen Kultur?, 265 (2010) with further references; Schweizer, supra note
150, 64.
195. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 595 et seq.
196. For the somewhat confusing and hairsplitting differentiation between equal rights
(Gleichberechtigung) and equal treatment (Gleichstellung), see, for example, the GVK
Report, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 561 et seq.; and Scholz, supra note 33,
Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG paras. 59 et seq. The term “equal rights” (Gleichberechtigung) seems to be
preferred by defenders of the formal-legal approach to gender equality, whereas the defenders
of the concept of real-social equality seem to prefer the term “equal treatment”
(Gleichstellung). The BVerfG does not ascribe different legal meaning to the terms, see
BVerfGE 74, 163, juris-version, rec. 45, 46, 51.
197. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 596, 597.
198. See Government Declaration, supra note 54, p. 20; supra, 147.
199. Scholz writes that the question of gender equality did not stand in “immediate
relationship” with unification; still he considers Art. 5 UT to be the basis for the new Art. 3
II, 2 GG; see Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG, para. 58.
200. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 618 et seq.
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actively realize gender equality as a fact of social reality.201
In this situation, it was no longer possible for the Court in 1992 to ignore
the East Germans’ will. As opposed to 1987, when the Court had decided
Altersruhegeld, in 1992 it was no longer only a minority opinion in the
literature that argued for a constitutional government obligation to realize
gender equality. The revolutionary East Germans had spoken as pouvoir
constituant, and they had demanded, among other things, an active
realization of gender equality. The West Germans had accepted this demand
by signing the UT. What the BVerfG was confronted with in 1992 were no
longer mere doctrinal or political arguments for a specific interpretation of
Art. 3 II GG. It was a forceful revolutionary statement by an important part
of the German people, which had caused institutional reactions, had found
legal manifestations, and had been transferred to unified Germany.202 When
the Court decided Nachtarbeit on January 28, 1992, a change of
constitutional dimensions had taken place, and unified Germany’s
institutions needed to respond.
The legislature, however, the institution primarily in charge of
integrating revolutionary achievements into the GG,203 did not seem up to
the task. Even though Art. 5 UT had provided a time frame of two years as
of October 3, 1990, the GVK, which finally proposed the new Art. 3 II, 2
GG in its Report in November 1993, had merely been founded on November
28/29, 1991.204 The Bundestag had not taken up the Kuratorium’s Draft
Constitution, according to which “[t]he government is obliged to bring about
and secure the equal participation of the sexes in all areas of society” (Art. 3
(2)), and “[m]easures promoting women in order to compensate them for
existing disadvantages are no favoritism based on gender” (Art. 3 (4)).205
Moreover, Art. 79 II GG required 2/3 majorities for amendments of the GG.
And indeed, the legislature turned out to be unable to perform the integrative
task. The Bundesrat’s Commission’s proposal of May 14, 1992, for an
amended Art. 3 II GG proves this impressively. After more than a year of
negotiations, the Commission’s proposal read “[w]omen and men have equal

201. See id. at 621 et seq.; see also the Constitutions of Brandenburg, Art. 12 III, 48 III, 2;
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Art. 13; Saxony, Art. 8; Saxony-Anhalt, Art. 34; Thuringia,
Art. 2 II; and Berlin, Art. 10 III.
202. For the details of this process of revolutionary constitutional lawmaking, see Jaggi,
supra note 6, 582 et seq.
203. See Art. 5 UT and Art. 31 UT in general and Art. 31 (1) UT in particular.
204. See supra, 7 et seq.
205. Schweizer, supra note 150, 54, 55 with further references.
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rights” as opposed to the original “[m]en and women have equal rights.”206
Some commentators called this proposal “ridiculous” in the light of
persistent real discrimination against women in Germany.207 It took the
GVK until October 1993 to agree on a proposal for the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG,
and it took the legislature until September 23, 1994 to adopt it.208 The new
Art. 3 II, 2 GG entered into force on November 15, 1994.209 Critics still call
the amendment a “formula compromise,” which enables all sides to assert
that it means what they want it to mean, leaving the meaning’s final
determination to the Court.210
At the same time, the actual need for government action fighting
discrimination against women had become increasingly urgent, particularly
in the new East German states. While the female employment rate in the
GDR prior to German unification had amounted to 91% in 1989 as opposed
to only 55% in West Germany,211 the number of employed women in the
new states had decreased significantly since the summer of 1990.212 By the
end of 1992, 64.9% of 1.1 million unemployed in the new states were
women.213 Within three years, from 1990 to 1993, only about half of the
households that prior to unification had had both partners employed still had
both partners employed.214 The partner still employed was usually male.215
This development reestablished women’s traditional economic
dependencies.216 Finally, women in the new East German states had been
hit particularly hard by some of the legal changes in the wake of German
unification. For example, unified Germany’s legislature had repealed the
additional consideration of times of child-raising for the acquisition of

206. See Bericht der Kommission Verfassungsreform des Bundesrates of May 14, 1992,
in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 420 et seq. (444).
207. Representative Ulrike Mascher, in: Jutta Limbach & Marion Eckertz-Höfer (eds.),
Frauenrechte im Grundgesetz des geeinigten Deutschland, 28 (1993).
208. See Beschluß des Bundesrates v. 23.09.1994, 834/94 (Beschluß), reprinted in: Fischer
& Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 1002.
209. See Art. 2 of the GG-amending law (BGBl I 1994, 3146).
210. See Isensee, supra note 37, 2583, 2585. Isensee calls the text a “dilatorischen
Formelkompromiss”; see also Schweizer, supra note 150, 84; and Jutta Limbach, in: Limbach
& Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 207, 299 et seq., 300.
211. Friedericke Maier, The labour market for women and employment perspectives in
the aftermath of German unification, Cambridge Journal of Economics 1993, 268.
212. Id., at 273 et seq.
213. Id., at 274.
214. Schweizer, supra note 150, 63.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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pension claims, had reduced women’s rights to be excused from work to tend
to sick children, and had reduced the availability of day care.217
In this situation of legislative deadlock in combination with increasing
dissatisfaction of East Germans with how revolutionary achievements were
being treated in unified Germany, the Court’s obiter dictum in Nachtarbeit
acquires a new meaning. When the Court, for the first time in the GG’s
history, stated that “the meaning of Art. 3 II GG that goes beyond the
meaning of Art. 3 III GG is that it postulates “an order to equal protection
and expands this order to apply also to social reality,”218 it engaged in an
attempt to integrate the revolutionary achievement of a constitutional
government obligation to realize gender equality into the existing
constitutional order under the GG. Even though the Court did not explicitly
justify its new interpretation of Art. 3 II GG, it clearly shows signs of the
integrative effort. The Court takes the old Art. 3 II GG and gives it a new
meaning that reflects what the revolutionary East Germans had fought for
and had successfully transferred to unified Germany.
The integrative pattern reoccurs in the Court’s later decisions on gender
equality. For example, in Kindererziehungszeiten219 the Court held
constitutional the provisions of two laws dealing with the consideration of
times of child-raising for purposes of acquiring rights in the statutory pension
insurance. The provisions examined by the Court allowed for the
consideration of times of child-raising for purposes of acquiring rights in the
statutory pension insurance only under certain restrictive conditions.220
Under the traditional formal-legal approach to gender equality, these
conditions would have been unproblematic because they applied equally to
women and men.221 The fact that, in reality, women mostly devoted their
time to child raising and were thus more strongly affected by the restrictive
conditions (less insurance times meaning lower pensions) would have been
irrelevant.
After 1990, however, it was no longer possible to apply the formal-legal
approach. The revolutionary East Germans had clearly demanded a
constitutional government obligation to make gender equality a social
217. Minister Marianne Birthler (Brandenburg), in Limbach & Eckertz-Höfer, supra note
207, 36.
218. BVerfGE 85, 191, juris-version, rec. 53.
219. BVerfG, Urteil v. 07.07.1992, 1 BvL 51/86, 1 BvL 50/87, 1 BvR 873/90, 1 BvR
761/91, BVerfGE 87, 1-48.
220. For the details, see BVerfGE 87, 1 juris-version, rec. 20.
221. See BVerfGE 87, 1, juris-version, rec. 5 et seq. referring to §§ 1227a RVO and 2a
AVG, which applied to “mothers and fathers” equally.
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reality. Against this background, the Court had to confirm its statement in
Nachtarbeit, this time, however, no longer in a mere obiter dictum but as part
of the holding:222 “However, the insufficient consideration of periods of
child-raising in the statutory pension insurance does in fact mainly
disadvantage mothers because, to this very day, it is mostly they who take
over child-raising and therefore limit, suspend, or give up their professional
careers.”223 This fact, the Court concludes, “causes the legislature’s
obligation based on Art. 3 II GG to work towards an equalization of the
living conditions for men and women.”224
Another example for the Court’s integrative efforts in the field of
gender equality is its decision in Arbeitgeberzuschuss zum
Mutterschaftsgeld225 The Court had to decide the constitutionality of a law
that obliged employers to contribute to payments for women during six
weeks before and eight weeks after childbirth. During this time, the law
prohibited a woman from working to protect her and her child against
“dangers of the workplace, excessive demands, and health problems”.226
Formally, the law was nondiscriminatory because the differentiation could
be justified with the biological difference of pregnancy. As a matter of social
reality, however, the employers’ obligation to contribute to women’s
payments during a time in which they were not allowed to work threatened
to disadvantage women in the job market since employers, trying to avoid
these contributions, were less likely to hire women.227 The Court itself
pointed out that, in an earlier decision on the same topic in 1974, it had
considered the law’s merely indirect impact on women’s job opportunities
irrelevant in terms of gender discrimination.228 It had argued that employers
were free to choose whether or not to hire women and thereby incur the legal
222. The Court held the provisions constitutional but made the decision’s reasons part of
the holding (“nach Maßgabe der Gründe”).
223. BVerfGE 87, 1, juris-version, rec. 140 (my italics).
224. See BVerfGE 87, 1, juris-version rec. 140 (my italics), where the Court explicitly
cites Nachtarbeit in support of this statement. The Court confirms the statement in
Kindererziehungszeiten II, BVerfG Beschluss v. 12.03.1996, 1 BvR 609/90, 1 BvR 692/90,
BVerfGE 94, 241-267, juris-version, rec. 52.
225. BVerfG Beschluss v. 18.11.2003, 1 BvR 302/96, BVerfGE 109, 64-96.
226. BVerfGE 109, 64, juris-version, rec. 1 et seq.
227. Id., rec. 217, 218, 222–226; the Court saw a violation of Art. 3 II GG in the fact that
the obligation to contribute to an insurance (Ausgleichs- und Umlageverfahren) that would
cover the expenses for women during the relevant time was limited to small enterprises.
Larger enterprises did not have to participate in the insurance scheme, so that they were less
likely to hire women, because their expenses for pregnant women and mothers, respectively,
would not be covered by the insurance; see Id.
228. BVerfGE 109, 64, juris-version, rec. 191.
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obligation to contribute to the payments.229
In 2003, however, this argument was no longer feasible because, as the
Court explicitly said, the law with respect to gender equality had changed.230
The Court referred “in particular” to the new sentence 2 of Art. 3 II GG,
added to the GG in 1994.231 What the Court referred to substantively,
however, was the new constitutional government obligation to realize gender
equality. Yet, this new obligation had not been established in 1994 by the
amendment of Art. 3 II GG but by the Court itself in 1992 in Nachtarbeit as
a product of its integrative efforts. It is this substantive change which the
Court in Arbeitgeberzuschuss zum Mutterschaftsgeld makes the basis for a
legislative obligation to come up with a regulation that, as a matter of social
reality, equalizes women’s job opportunities.232
In summary, my analysis offers a new perspective on why the Court
developed a new approach to gender equality in 1992, at a time when the
adoption of the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG was still more than two years away and
very unsure. Realizing that unified Germany’s legislature was getting
nowhere in its attempt to integrate revolutionary achievements on gender
equality into the existing constitutional order under the GG, the Court took
over by interpreting Art. 3 II GG as establishing a government obligation to
realize gender equality. This understanding takes both constitutional
interpretation and constitutional history more seriously.

III. Abortion
Abortion has been a highly controversial political and legal issue in
Germany for a long time.233 The controversy has centered on the balancing
of two competing constitutional rights: (i) the unborn child’s right to life234
and (ii) the woman’s right to self-determination. Based on this controversy,
there were, prior to 1993, basically two models for the legal treatment of

229. BVerfGE 37, 121, juris-version, rec. 23; BVerfGE 109, 64, juris-version, rec. 191.
230. BVerfGE 109, 64, juris-version, rec. 191.
231. Id.
232. Id., rec. 192, 225, 231, 232.
233. For an overview, see, for example, Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 154
et seq.; Donald Kommers, Liberty and Community in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases
in Comparative Perspective, BYU L. REV. 371, 391 et seq. (1985); KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 335 et seq. (2nd
ed. 1997).
234. For an explanation of this concept, see Kommers, BYU L. REV. 371, 393 et seq.
(1985).
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abortions in Germany: (i) the so-called indication model, which emphasizes
the unborn child’s right to life and (ii) the so-called time-phase model, which
emphasizes the woman’s right to self-determination, at least during the first
twelve weeks of the pregnancy.
The indication model makes abortion a crime and only provides for
exceptions if specific indications are ascertained. The indications are: (i) the
mother’s life or health is in danger (the so-called medical indication); (ii) the
pregnancy is the result of a crime, such as rape or incest (the so-called ethical
indication); (iii) the unborn child is diagnosed with birth defects (the socalled eugenic indication); and (iv) the pregnant woman suffers from social
and psychological conflicts that are as damaging to her as any of the other
indications (the so-called social indication). The time-phase model, on the
other hand, grants the pregnant woman a right to abortion during the first
twelve weeks of the pregnancy under the condition that, prior to the abortion,
she participates in so-called “preventive counseling”.235
In 1975, in Abortion I,236 the BVerfG repudiated a legislative attempt
to introduce a time-phase model in West Germany. The Court declared the
law unconstitutional and argued that it did not provide for an effective
protection of the unborn child. Based on the GG, the Court argued, criminal
punishment of abortion throughout the entire pregnancy was necessary to
effectively protect the unborn child.237 In 1993, in Abortion II,238 the Court

235. That the woman has a right to an abortion during the first twelve weeks of the
pregnancy is the time-phase model’s characteristic criterion. This is its main difference
compared to the Court’s counseling model, under which the woman, during the first twelve
weeks of a pregnancy, does not have a right to an abortion but is only free from criminal
punishment if she has an abortion. Preventive abortion counseling“ means that the woman is
„instructed about the public and private assistance available for pregnant women, for mothers,
and children, especially such assistance that facilitates the continuation of the pregnancy and
eases the conditions of mother and child“. In addition, the woman must be counseled on the
medical aspects of an abortion by a physician; see § 218c (1) of the Abortion Reform Act of
June 18, 1974 (5. Strafrechtsreformgesetz v. 18.06.1974, BGBl I 1974, 1297 – 1300).
236. BVerfG, Urteil v. 25.02.1975, 1 BvF 1-6/74, NJW 1975, 573 et seq.
237. See BVerfG, NJW 1975, 579: “Durch die völlige Aufhebung der Strafbarkeit ist
jedoch eine Schutzlücke entstanden, welche die Sicherung des sich entwickelnden Lebens in
einer nicht geringen Anzahl von Fällen gänzlich beseitigt” and 581: “Jedoch vermögen weder
die gegenwärtig angebotenen und gewährten Hilfen dieser Art noch die im 5. StrRG
[Strafrechtsreformgesetz] vorgesehene Beratung den individuellen Lebensschutz zu ersetzen,
den eine Strafnorm grundsätzlich auch heute noch in den Fällen gewährt, in denen für den
Abbruch einer Schwangerschaft kein nach der Wertordnung des Grundgesetzes achtenswerter
Grund besteht” and “Er [der Gesetzgeber] muß vielmehr den ernsthaften Versuch
unternehmen, durch eine Differenzierung der Strafandrohung einen wirksameren
Lebensschutz . . . zu erreichen.”
238. BVerfG, Urteil v. 28.05.1993, 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, 2 BvF 5/92, NJW 1993, 1751 et seq.
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changed its mind. After unified Germany’s legislature, in an attempt to
fulfill its obligation under Art. 31 (4) UT, had adopted another time-phase
model in an act dating from July 27, 1992,239 the Court declared that during
the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy criminal punishment of abortion was
no longer required by the GG to effectively protect the unborn child. Instead,
the Court now considered a specified model of counseling sufficient.240
Again, the question is how to explain this change? As in the previous
cases, there are authors who simply deny any change. Other authors provide
the typical doctrinal explanations of judicial restraint and deference to the
legislature. Again, others think of the change as a product of judicial politics
trying to find a compromise between the different East and West German
abortion models. Finally, there are authors who think the Court’s opinion is
simply paradoxical and wrong.
Again, I want to offer a new explanation. Putting Abortion II into
historical perspective, I will show that it should be understood as the Court’s
attempt to integrate the revolutionary achievement of individual
empowerment with the traditional West German emphasis on the protection
of the unborn child, the social function of criminal law, and women’s
traditional role in society.
In what follows, I will first outline the similarities and fundamental
differences between the Court’s constitutional treatment of abortion in 1975
on the one hand and 1993 on the other. I will then summarize the traditional
understanding of Abortion II and show why it is not convincing. Finally, I
will present my own understanding of Abortion II as the Court’s attempt to
integrate revolutionary achievements into the existing constitutional order
under the GG.
The Decision: Abortion II (1993)
In Abortion II the Court decided on the constitutionality of a new law
on abortion adopted in July 1992.241 The new law was the legislature’s
response to Art. 31 (4) UT, which had made it “the task of unified Germany’s
legislature, by December 31, 1992, the latest, to adopt a law that better
239. Art. 13 Schwangeren- und Familienhilfegesetz of 27.07.1992 (BGBl I 1992, 1398)
amended §§ 218 et seq. StGB.
240. See BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756 et seq.
241. The law’s official name is Gesetz zum Schutz des vorgeburtlichen/werdenden
Lebens, zur Förderung einer kinderfreundlicheren Gesellschaft, für Hilfen im
Schwangerschaftskonflikt und zur Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs (Schwangerenund Familienhilfegesetz) v. 27.07.1992 (BGBl I 1992, 1398).
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provides for the protection of the unborn life and for the support of pregnant
women . . .”.242 The law introduced a time-phase model, i.e. it declared
abortions undertaken during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy “not
illegal” if the woman had participated in specified counseling prior to the
abortion. The Court held § 218a Abs. 1 StGB of the new law
unconstitutional arguing that the GG does not permit to declare “not illegal”
abortions undertaken during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy under
the stated requirements. The Court, moreover, held that the specific
regulation of the counseling violated the GG.243 Finally, the Court issued an
enforcement order entering its own counseling model into force for as long
as the legislature would need to come up with a new law that complied with
the holding.244 The enforcement order prevented the continued application
of the GDR’s time phase model in the new East German states based on Art.
31 (4) last sentence UT.245
Analytically, Abortion II can be divided into two parts: part 1
confirming principles established in Abortion I and part 2 developing a new
approach.
In part 1 the Court confirms the following basic positions of Abortion
I: A fetus is an “unborn human life” that possesses human dignity and has an
own right to life. This right must be protected by the government against
dangers emanating from other individuals, including the mother.246
Effective protection of the fetus requires the legislature to establish, as a
matter of principle, the mother’s legal obligation to carry the child to term.247
This legal obligation may only be suspended under exceptional
circumstances when compliance with the obligation is “intolerable.” These
are circumstances in which the aforementioned medical, ethical, eugenic, or
social indications have been ascertained.248 Criminal law is the ultima ratio
to prevent conduct that is so harmful that its prevention is particularly urgent.
Therefore, the criminalization of abortion, regularly, is the right means to
establish a woman’s legal obligation to carry the child to term.249 However,
242. See infra, 67.
243. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1752.
244. Id., 1752, 1773, 1774.
245. See infra, 67, 68; see also Rüdiger Breuer, Der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz des
Lebens - Integrationsprobleme im Widervereinigten Deutschland, in: Jörn Ipsen (ed.),
Verfassungsrecht im Wandel, 25, 39 (1995).
246. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1753.
247. Id., 1753, 1754.
248. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1754.
249. Id., 1754, 1755.
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the criminalization of abortion is not required if and to the extent to which
other, less invasive, means can provide constitutionally sufficient protection
of the unborn life. If that is the case, it may suffice to express a woman’s
general obligation to carry the child to term by legal means other than
criminal law.250
In part 2 the Court develops rules for how the state may discharge its
constitutional obligation to protect the u nborn child. These rules manifest a
fundamental shift in the Court’s constitutional concept of unborn-child
protection compared to its 1975 abortion decision. Conceptionally, there is a
shift from repression of abortion through criminal law to prevention of
abortion through combining a timely limited freedom to have an abortion
with abortion counseling. Moreover, there is a shift from a concept of
imposition that tried to force the woman to carry the child to term to a concept
of empowerment that tries to motivate the woman to carry the child to term
by offering support. In what follows I will summarize these concepts’
characteristics and fundamental differences.
From repression to prevention. In Abortion I the Court held that even
though criminal punishment was the legislature’s sharpest sword and must
only be applied as ultima ratio, its application was constitutionally required
to prevent abortions. In the Court’s view, it was uncertain whether other,
less invasive means, such as the time-phase model, would be at least equally
effective in protecting the unborn child.251 Even though the criminal law’s
effectiveness in protecting the unborn child was equally unproven and it was
“generally acknowledged” that criminal law as applied until 1975 had lacked
effectiveness,252 the Court nevertheless insisted on the criminalization of
abortion. It argued that the existing empirical information did not allow for
a definite conclusion regarding the time-phase model’s effectiveness in
reducing the number of abortions.253 In this situation, the Court argued, the
importance of the child’s right to life required the strongest measure of
protection and did not allow for experiments.254 The legislature, already in
1975, had argued that a time-phase model in combination with preventive

250. Id., 1755.
251. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 577, 578, 580, 584.
252. Id., 578; the original reads: “Es ist allgemein anerkannt, dass der bisherige § 218
StGB, gerade weil er für nahezu alle Fälle des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs undifferenzierte
Strafe androhte, das sich entwickelnde Leben im Ergebnis nur unzureichend geschützt hat”;
see id., D. II. on p. 578.
253. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 580.
254. Id.; the original reads: “Experimente sind aber bei dem hohen Wert des zu
schützenden Rechtsgutes nicht zulässig.”
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counseling would be more effective in protecting the unborn child. The
threat of criminal punishment, the argument went, drives women into
illegality and thus keeps them from participating in preventive counseling
that would protect the unborn child.255 Already in 1975, the dissenting
justices Wiltraut Rupp-v. Brünneck and Helmut Simon argued that the timephase model was constitutional unless it was proven to be ineffective in
protecting the unborn child. They argued it would violate the principle of
proportionality to insist on criminal punishment of abortion unless it was
proven that criminal punishment, i.e. the ultima ratio, was able and necessary
to protect the unborn child.256 However, the Court’s majority in 1975
decided to “reverse the burden of proof”257 and required the legislature to
prove that its time-phase model was “at least” as effective as, or even more
effective than, criminal punishment in protecting the unborn child.258 Since
the legislature was unable to prove that, the time-phase model was held
unconstitutional.259 The Court thus insisted on criminal law as a means to
repress abortions.
This approach changed fundamentally in Abortion II. In Abortion II,
the Court declared a model constitutional that renounced the criminalization
of abortions undertaken during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy after
specific preventive counseling (the Court calls it the “counseling model”).260
The Court argued that it “appeared defensible” that the counseling model
provided effective protection of the unborn child,261 even though the model’s
actual effectiveness remained unproven (as it had been in 1975). The Court,
thus, just dropped the Abortion I requirement according to which the
legislature had to prove the counseling model’s effectiveness. It was
undisputed that the indication model as it had been applied so far had not
been effective.262 However, that was the case in 1975, too.263 Still, in 1975
255. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 578.
256. Id., at 584.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id., at 578, 580, 581.
260. See for example, BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1757 et seq.
261. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756, 1757; on p. 1756 the Court argues that it examines whether
the legislature’s prognosis that its concept of protection is sufficiently effective is “defensible”
(“vertretbar”); on p. 1757 the Court states that the legislature’s “appraisal” according to which
the state has a better chance to protect the unborn child if it cooperates with the mother
“appears justified” (“lassen die Einschätzung berechtigt erscheinen”).
262. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1757.
263. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 578: “It is generally acknowledged that the previous § 218 StGB
. . . has in the end only insufficiently protected the developing life.”
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the Court stated that “[i]t is constitutionally unobjectionable and must be
accepted if the legislature tries to comply with its obligation to provide a
better protection of unborn life through preventive measures, including a
counseling that strengthens the woman’s own responsibility.”264 That
sounded fundamentally different in 1993:
It is, however, controversial, scientifically as well as
politically, whether a counseling model for abortions in the early
phase of the pregnancy provides a better protection for the
unborn life than the previous regulation [i.e., the previous
indication model]. . . . In the face of the demonstrated reasons
that speak against the continuation of the previous indication
model, however, such uncertainties do not prevent the
legislature, as a matter of principle, from introducing a
counseling model.265
Had the Court stuck to its 1975 principles, it would have had to
conclude that, because of the remaining uncertainties regarding the
counseling model’s effectiveness, criminal punishment was still
constitutionally required.266 But the Court did not, in 1993, the Court was
content with the fact that the legislature’s assessment of the counseling
model’s effectiveness was “defensible.”267 The Court, thus, allowed for a
conceptual shift from the criminal repression of abortions to the prevention
of abortions through counseling.
From imposition to empowerment. Another profound difference
between Abortion I and Abortion II lies in the Court’s psychological and
sociological concepts to protect the unborn child. Abortion I stands for an
authoritarian imposition of a traditional mother role upon women by
threatening them with criminal punishment in case of non-compliance.
Abortion II, while holding on to a legal obligation to carry the child to term,
emphasizes a concept of empowering the woman to decide in favor of the
child. It does so by respecting the woman’s decision to have an abortion
264. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 578 (my italics).
265. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1757 (my italics).
266. In 1975 the Court held that the legislature may only refrain from criminal punishment
of abortion if another legal sanction would be at its disposal that would prevent abortions as
effectively as criminal punishment; see BVerfG, NJW 1975, 577, 578.
267. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756; the original reads: “. . . die verfassungsrechtliche Prüfung
erstreckt sich . . . darauf, ob der Gesetzgeber . . . seinen Einschätzungsspielraum ‘in
vertretbarer Weise‘ gehandhabt hat.”
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during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy after counseling and at the
same time supporting her, through public welfare and counseling, in
deciding in favor of the child.268
In both decisions, the Court stated a theoretical priority of
empowerment over imposition, i.e. of social support over criminal
punishment.269 However, the Court’s elaborations on active governmental
support in Abortion I were cursory, at best. After stating that the government
must “primarily” apply “social-political and welfare means” to protect the
child,270 the Court revealed that the goal of such means was not to empower
the woman to make a decision in favor of the child but to force upon her the
conviction that it is her duty to carry the child to term: “the main goal will
be to strengthen the future mother’s willingness to . . . accept her pregnancy
and to carry the child to term.”271 “to reawaken the mother’s willingness to
protect the child . . . and if necessary to strengthen it should be the premier
goal of the state’s efforts to protect life.”272 The Court considered social
support as slow and ineffective in shaping a woman’s attitude while it
emphasized the effectiveness of criminal law in shaping social perceptions
and protecting the unborn life.273 While the Court cursorily addressed the
need to inform about how to prevent unwanted pregnancies and how to
access effective social support,274 it emphasized what it apparently
considered to be the real problem: “there are many women . . . who do not
suffer from economic plight or a serious conflict. They reject their
pregnancy because they are not willing to endure the encompassing hardship
and to accept the natural motherly duties.”275 The most effective means to
correct such attitudes was, according to the Court, the threat of criminal
punishment because “. . . already the pure existence of such a threat . . . has

268. Breuer writes that the state must act “cooperatively and persuasively” with respect to
the participants in the conflict; see Breuer, supra note 245, 48.
269. See BVerfG, NJW 1975, 576.
270. Id.; the original reads: “Es ist daher Aufgabe des Staates, in erster Linie
sozialpolitische und fürsorgerische Mittel zur Sicherung des werdenden Lebens einzusetzen.”
271. Id.; the original reads: “Dabei wird es hauptsächlich darauf ankommen, die
Bereitschaft der werdenden Mutter zu stärken, die Schwangerschaft . . . anzunehmen und die
Leibesfrucht zum vollen Leben zu bringen.”
272. Id.; the original reads: “Den mütterlichen Schutzwillen . . . wieder zu wecken und
erforderlichenfalls zu stärken sollte das vornehmste Ziel der staatlichen Bemühungen um
Lebensschutz sein.”
273. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 576 et seq., 579.
274. Id., 581.
275. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 579 (my italics).
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an effect on the peoples’ perception of values and on their conduct.”276
These arguments reflect the Court’s perception of a government that imposes
a traditional role upon pregnant women and tries to enforce this role by
threatening with criminal punishment in case of non-compliance.
The Court’s perception changed fundamentally in Abortion II. To be
sure, the Court held on to the pregnant woman’s legal obligation to carry the
child to term. However, to achieve compliance with this obligation, the
Court allowed the legislature to refrain from threats of criminal punishment
during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy and to respect the woman’s
decision to have an abortion during that time. The Court further wanted to
empower the woman to make a responsible decision in favor of the child by
obliging the government to actively generate a social environment that
encourages a woman to carry her child to term. The Court emphasizes that
the government must protect the unborn child not only against dangers
emanating from other people but must also “stand up to such dangers . . . that
are rooted in the actual and foreseeable real circumstances of the life of the
woman and her family . . . .”277 Where Abortion I laconically referred to the
insight that it was the government’s foremost obligation to prevent abortions
by way of information and effective social support,278 Abortion II elaborates
in great detail on an active government obligation to make sure that abortions
are not undertaken because of an “economic emergency.”279 For example,
the Court argues that the government must prevent disadvantages that
women may suffer as a result of the pregnancy with respect to vocational
training and professional development.280 The government must examine
factors that may burden pregnant women or mothers and must make an effort
to repeal or alleviate difficulties. The government must actively promote a
child-friendly society through, among other things, appropriate regulation of
employment, landlord-tenant relationships, and pensions.281 With respect to
the latter, the Court explicitly refers to Kindererziehungszeiten.282 Finally,
the Court gives detailed instructions to the legislature on how to regulate
abortion counseling.283 These elements reflect a concept of empowering
women to decide in favor of the child.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1755 (my italics).
BVerfG, NJW 1975, 581.
BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1755.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 1760 et seq.
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Traditional Understanding
Authors differ as to what the Court said in Abortion II and how that is
different from what it had said in Abortion I. Alec Stone Sweet’s, for
example, simply denies a change in the Court’s constitutional abortion
requirements from 1975 to 1993. According to Stone Sweet, the BVerfG in
1993 essentially upheld its 1975 ruling.284 Other, more differentiated,
opinions emphasize either doctrinal or judicial policy aspects.
Some authors approve of Abortion II as a return to judicial restraint.
They argue that, where the Court in 1975 had acted like a legislator by
insisting on a criminalizing of abortion, in 1993 it deferred to the
legislature’s basic decision to forego criminal punishment during the first
twelve weeks of the pregnancy after counseling.285 Others criticize Abortion
II for a lack of judicial restraint, arguing that the Court’s detailed
prescriptions, in particular with respect to counseling, are a “usurpation” of
the legislative function.286
Still others consider Abortion II an act of judicial politics. Quint, for
example, views the Court’s counseling model as a political compromise
between West Germany’s indication model and the GDR’s time-phase
model.287 Some authors imply that the Court surrendered to the Zeitgeist,288
while others complain that the Court did not sufficiently consider GDR
positions in the compromise.289
284. Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges, Constitutional Politics in Europe, 112
(2000).
285. For the argument, see Justices Rupp-v. Brünneck and Simon dissenting in Abortion
I, NJW 1975, 582, 583.
286. See Hans-Peter Schneider, Die Vollstreckungskompetenz nach § 35 BVerfGG - Ein
Notverordnungsrecht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW)
1994, 2591.
287. Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 159 et seq., 163 et seq.; Quint concludes
that “the underlying result of the parliamentary legislation – as modified by the Court’s
decision – is actually closer to what might have been expected in a new constitution, adopting
certain ideas from east and west under article 146. . . . In the end . . . the east kept a remnant
of its own position on this matter – a view derived from the old regime but also endorsed in
the Round Table’s draft constitution”; see id., 164, 165; similarly Breuer, supra note 245, 47.
288. See Willi Geiger, Menetekel - An die Adresse des Bundestags, der Bundesregierung
und des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Schriftenreihe der Juristenvereinigung Lebensrecht e.V.
zu Köln, Nr. 10, 33 et seq. (1993); and Hans Faller, Beratung und Hilfe statt Strafe, Die Urteile
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Schwangerschaftsabbruch von 1975 und 1993,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) v. 08.06.1993, 12.
289. Anita Gradke, Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BVerfG zu § 218 StGB, Neue Justiz

1 - FINAL - Jaggi - Revolutionary Reform in German .docx

2018]

Revolutionary Reform in German Constitutional Law

6/5/2018 11:41 AM

221

Finally, there are authors who are simply confused by the Court’s
decision and call it contradictory and paradoxical.290 This criticism is
reflected in the statement that “the majority opinion, at the end of the day,
prohibits an act and declares it illegal but at the same time allows it and
regulates it legally.”291
None of these explanations are satisfactory. Stone Sweet’s approach
can be rejected offhand because it simply ignores the described fundamental
changes from Abortion I to Abortion II. Whatever one thinks of the
decisions’ details, it seems impossible to deny the following change. Prior
to Abortion II, the Court had insisted on criminal punishment of abortion
throughout the pregnancy as part of the indication model. As of Abortion II
the Court has accepted a so-called counseling model according to which
women can have an abortion during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy
after preventive counseling without being threatened with criminal
punishment.292 If that is no fundamental change, I don’t know what is.
The arguments for or against judicial deference are inconclusive
because they focus on individual aspects of Abortion II and ignore the bigger
(NJ) 1993, 347, 348 criticizes that “the exclusive basis for the Court’s deductions is the old
states’ indication model” and that the Court doesn’t take the GDR’s model, described as
“time-phase model with support concept” (“Fristenlösung mit Hilfskonzept”), into
consideration. Moreover, in Gradke’s view, the Court does not consider that under the GDR
law the number of abortions had decreased since the 1980s and that the birth rates in the GDR
have always been higher than in West Germany; see Gradke, id., 348. Gradke argues that the
Court’s new concept is a limitation of liberty and self-determination for women in the former
GDR, who had been hoping for more freedom as a result of unification, see id.
290. Monika Frommel, § 218 StGB: Straflos aber rechtswidrig; zielorientiert aber
ergebnisoffen - Paradoxien der Übergangsregelung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Kritische
Justiz (KJ) 1993, 327, 329.
291. Gradke, supra note 289, 347.
292. Except for Stone Sweet, most authors seem to recognize this fundamental difference
between Abortion I and Abortion II, see, for example, Christian Starck, Der
verfassungsrechtliche Schutz des ungeborenen menschlichen Lebens, Juristenzeitung (JZ)
1993, 818, who writes that the Court’s holding in 1993 reflects the general acceptance of the
time-phase model as the new model of protecting the unborn child; or Frommel, supra note
290, 330, who writes, “In terms of criminal law, there is a time-phase model in the form of
the so-called counseling model in force since July 16, 1993”; Breuer, supra note 245, 45 et
seq. calls Abortion II a “paradigm change” (“Paradigmenwechsel”) and a “changed
adjudication” (“gewandelte Rechtsprechung”); see also the Court itself, who writes in
BVerfGE 98, 265, 302 about a change “. . . from criminal law as a governmental reaction to
abortions to a concept of protection through counseling safeguarded by criminal law” (“. . .
vom Strafrecht als staatlicher Reaktion auf Schwangerschaftsabbrüche zu einem strafrechtlich
abgesicherten Konzept des Schutzes durch Beratung”); Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra
note 28, 160 writes: “. . . in a very significant theoretical shift, the Court for the first time
moved away from a general requirement for the criminal penalization of abortion” (my
italics).
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picture. As a matter of fact, the Court partly deferred to the legislature and
partly did not. It deferred to the legislature’s general decision to replace
criminal punishment with social support and counseling during the first
twelve weeks of the pregnancy. It did not defer to the legislature’s specific
implementation of this new model and, at great length and detail, developed
its own counseling model, which applied until the legislature came up with
a model that fulfilled the Court’s demands.
Finally, characterizing Abortion II as an act of judicial politics that,
more or less successfully, compromises between West German and East
German abortion models gives up too easily on the possibility of explaining
the changes in terms of constitutional interpretation.
My Understanding: Abortion II as an act of integration
My thesis is that Abortion II, just like the other decisions that I have
analyzed so far, is better, i.e., more realistically and meaningfully,
understood as an act of constitutional interpretation in the sense of
integrating revolutionary achievements. The Court, confronted with a
legislature that had failed to properly integrate into the existing constitutional
order under the GG the 1989 Revolution’s achievements regarding abortion,
took over the integrative task and developed its own counseling model as a
means of integration.
Abortion I (1975) clearly stands for West Germany’s constitutional
approach to abortion. Its characteristics were repression and imposition.293
It emphasized the constitutional protection of the unborn child and tried to
achieve it by requiring the repression of abortions through criminal law.
Where it included governmental support for women as a means to protect the
unborn child, this means was of subordinate and limited importance, as can
be seen in the brevity with which the Court mentioned it.294 The approach
saw the government as authoritatively imposing a traditional role upon
pregnant women and enforcing this role through criminal law.295
One of the 1989 Revolution’s constitutional achievements is the
principle of individual empowerment, which comprises of (i) a constitutional
government obligation to establish a social environment in which
constitutional rights can become a social reality for everyone; (ii) the
promotion of real-social (as opposed to only formal-legal) equality for
293. See supra, 57 et seq., 60 et seq.
294. See BVerfG, NJW 1975, 576; supra, 283.
295. See supra, 61.
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women; and (iii) a woman’s right to abortion.296 With respect to abortion,
the principle of individual empowerment aims at preventing abortions by
empowering women through governmental support, counseling, and the
liberty, during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy, to make a free and
responsible decision for or against the unborn child. During this early period
of the pregnancy, individual empowerment’s clear emphasis is on the
woman’s right to self-determination, not on the protection of the unborn
child. A woman’s right to abortion was an important demand by the people
in the streets, expressed in chants, such as “Hätte Frau Marx abgetrieben,
wär uns viel erspart geblieben”.297 This demand found its legal manifestation
in both the Social Charter and the RTD. The Social Charter granted women
a right to abortion.298 Art. 4 (3) of the revolutionaries’ draft constitution gave
women the right to a self-determined pregnancy and obliged the government
to protect the unborn child by providing social support.299 East Germany’s
first freely elected government emphasized the necessity of economic and
moral support, particularly for women, in order to protect the unborn child.300
Moreover, in direct response to the people in the streets, the government
decided to preserve the GDR’s time-phase model instead of taking over West
Germany’s indication model.301 The UT transferred these achievements to
unified Germany. Art. 31 (4) UT obliged unified Germany’s legislature to
improve the legal protection of the unborn child particularly through legally
guaranteed claims for women, particularly to counseling and social help.302
It underlined the importance of the task by stating that the GDR’s abortion
law would remain in force in the new states until unified Germany’s
legislature would come up with an improved concept.
Abortion II must be understood as integrating several principles: (i)
West Germany’s emphasis on the protection of the unborn child with the
revolutionaries’ emphasis on the woman’s right to self-determination; (ii)
West Germany’s concept of repressing abortions through criminal law with
the revolutionaries’ concept of preventing abortions through governmental
support and counseling; and (iii) West Germany’s authoritative imposition

296. See supra, 3, 4.
297. “If Mrs. Marx had had an abortion we would have been spared a lot,” quoted in:
Tetzner, supra note 50, 132.
298. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 595 et seq.
299. Id., 597.
300. See Government Declaration, supra note 54, p. 19.
301. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 609. For a brief summary of the GDR’s time-phase model,
see Breuer, supra note 245, 34.
302. My italics.
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of a traditional role upon women with the revolutionaries’ principle of
individual empowerment through active governmental support.
(i) Abortion II holds on to the pregnant woman’s legal obligation to
carry the child to term, so that abortions remain illegal throughout the entire
pregnancy. Hence, the Court had to hold unconstitutional the legislature’s
attempt to declare abortions undertaken within the first twelve weeks of the
pregnancy “not illegal.” I consider this the result of the Court’s attempt to
integrate the revolutionaries’ emphasis on the woman’s right to selfdetermination with the West German emphasis on the unborn child’s right
to life. Trying to harmonize these two conflicting constitutional positions,
the Court argues that the unborn child’s right to life prevents the typical
balancing in which each legal position gives way a little.303 It is impossible
to gradually reduce or temporarily suspend the right to life because a
reduction or suspension of that right necessarily means the individual life’s
complete destruction.304 This is why the Court holds it “impossible to find a
balance that protects the unborn life and at the same time grants the pregnant
woman a right to abortion, because abortion is always killing the unborn
life.”305 Against this background the Court holds it impossible to let the
woman’s right to self-determination prevail over the unborn’s right to life
even for a limited period of time.306 The Court is thus only willing to grant
a right to abortion in cases in which carrying the child to term is
intolerable.307 These are the cases in which the aforementioned indications
have been ascertained.308 Whatever one thinks of these arguments,309 they
clearly show the Court’s self-conscious effort to harmonize West Germany’s
emphasis on the protection of the unborn life with the revolutionaries’
emphasis on the protection of the woman’s right to self-determination. That
the revolutionary principle had to step back because the Court found it
impossible to compromise the unborn’s right to life is no evidence to the
contrary. It must rather be explained with the fact that the right to life is
protected, inter alia, by Art. 1 I, 1 GG (human dignity), the GG’s most

303. In German constitutional law this is known as the establishment of “practical
concordance” (“praktische Konkordanz“); see Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des
Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, paras. 317 et seq. (20 ed. 1999).
304. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1754.
305. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1754 (my italics).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. For a critique, see, for example, the dissenters Justices Mahrenholz and Sommer in:
BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1774 et seq.
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important principle.
(ii) While the unborn child’s right to life cannot be subjected to
proportional balancing with the woman’s right to self-determination, the
Court has always recognized a higher degree of flexibility when it comes to
devising the means with which to protect the right to life. Based on West
Germany’s concept of repressing abortions through criminal law, the Court
in 1975 insisted on criminal law as the only effective means of protecting the
unborn life (indication model). The 1989 Revolution has favored a different
concept. Based on the principle of individual empowerment, it has promoted
a woman’s right to abortion during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy
in combination with social support and counseling to enable the woman to
make a responsible decision (time-phase model). In Abortion II the Court
takes up both concepts and tries to integrate them by replacing, during the
first twelve weeks of the pregnancy, the concept of criminal punishment with
the concept of counseling, however, without granting a right to abortion,
except in cases in which an indication is present. The Court itself explains
this new “counseling model” as a product of integration by self-consciously
putting it into historical perspective and explicitly referring to both the UT
and the will of the revolutionary East Germans in order to justify it:
[A] new regulation of the questions related to abortion has
been prompted by Art. 31 IV UT;310 unified Germany’s
legislature may argue in favor of the counseling model that it may
appear to be better suited to bring together the eastern and
western legal orders that had so far been characterized by a
time-phase model on the one hand and an indication model on
the other, as well as the different legal perceptions of the people
that have been shaped in different ways by these two different
concepts.311
This language demonstrates that, instead of only engaging in judicial
politics, the Court tries to integrate two different legal concepts from two
different eras of German constitutional history.
(iii) Finally, the Court’s shift from a concept of authoritative imposition
upon women of a traditional role by threatening with criminal punishment to
a concept of empowering women to make a responsible decision, preferably
in favor of carrying the child to term, is also best understood as a product of
interpretive integration. In 1975, the Court had insisted on criminalizing
abortions as the most effective means to shape people’s attitudes and

310. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756.
311. Id. (my italics).
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convince women to accept their “natural motherly duties.”312 In 1993, after
the revolutionary East Germans had successfully fought for the principle of
individual empowerment and this principle had been transferred to unified
Germany, imposition by criminalization was no longer feasible. To be sure,
the unborn child’s right to life still required protection and could not be
compromised. However, in the light of the revolutionary principle of
individual empowerment, women’s social reality, including their
psychological and economic reality, needed to be taken into account more
strongly.
This is reflected, for instance, in the Court’s arguments supporting the
counseling model: “the woman experiences her conflict as a personal one
and refuses an appraisal by third parties”313; “[t]he more third parties are
trying to influence the woman, the more she withdraws into illegality”;314
and “giving the woman the final say provides the best chances to open her
up for counseling” and thus for carrying the child to term.315 It is also
reflected in the Court’s insightful elaborations on the necessities of
counseling. Accordingly, counseling must be goal-oriented (towards
protecting the unborn child), but open as to the result; encouraging, but not
intimidating; awakening understanding, but not indoctrinating.316 The
government must convey to the woman her legal duty to carry the child to
term but must not impose this value upon her but must take her and her
conflict seriously and must try to convince her through reasonable
information and active help.317 Finally, the Court clearly refers to individual
empowerment by explicitly putting the government in charge of building a
child-friendly society, realizing equality for women, and providing women
with the social support necessary to make a free and responsible decision in
favor of the child. The Court’s “changed perception [in Abortion II] of the
personality and dignity of the woman”318 strongly reflects the principle of
individual empowerment, a constitutional achievement of the 1989
Revolution.
Against this background, I think my analysis draws a much more
realistic and meaningful picture than the traditional understanding of why
the Court changed the abortion model in 1993. It shows that the Court
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See supra, 61.
BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756.
Id.
Id., at 1757.
BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1760, 1761.
Id.
See the dissenters Justices Mahrenholz and Sommer in BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1774.
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engaged in an interpretive effort that takes the achievements of the 1989
Revolution seriously and tries to integrate them into the existing
constitutional order under the GG.

IV. Housing
It is finally a decision by the BVerfG on May 26, 1993 that features
another remarkable change in the Court’s treatment of an important
constitutional topic in the wake of German unification.319 In this decision
the Court, for the first time, considers a tenant’s right to ownership in the
rented apartment property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG.320 It thereby
elevates the tenant to the same level of constitutional protection under Art.
14 GG as the landlord. Prior to the decision, the tenant’s protection under
Art. 14 GG had been weaker than the landlord’s because only the landlord
had enjoyed property protection, while the tenant was only protected by the
landlord’s property’s social obligation under Art. 14 II GG.321
Like the decisions on gender equality and abortion, the decision on
tenant protection came at a time when unified Germany’s legislature proved
unable to integrate revolutionary achievements into the existing
constitutional order under the GG. Bernd Rüthers, for example, writes that
just when the GVK had turned out to be unable to agree on proposing a
constitutional right to housing as an amendment to the GG, the Court
introduced this right “through the backdoor” by holding the tenant’s right to
ownership in the rented apartment to be property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1
GG.322 The decision not only provides tenants and landlords with equal
constitutional protection under Art. 14 GG. It also makes every legislative
attempt to cut down on existing tenant protection subject to the strict
requirements of property protection under Art. 14 I GG.323 Tenants’ Art. 14 I
GG rights must, moreover, be considered in the interpretation and application of

319. BVerfG, Beschluss v. 26.05.1993, 1 BvR 208/93, BVerfGE 89, 1-14.
320. Art. 14 I GG states: “Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their
content and limits shall be defined by the laws.”
321. Art. 14 II GG states: “Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public
good.”
322. Bernd Rüthers, Ein Grundrecht auf Wohnung durch die Hintertür?, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (NJW) 1993, 2587; similarly Otto Depenheuer, Der Mieter als Eigentümer? Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BVerfG v. 26.05.1993, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW)
1993, 2561, 2564.
323. See Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2564.
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every ordinary law, public and private.324
As in the cases that I have analyzed so far, the question is: Why did the
Court do that? And why in 1993 and not, for example, in 1989 or 1990 when
it also had opportunities to do so? Again, there is a traditional understanding
based on doctrinal as well as judicial policy arguments, which, again, I will
show is unconvincing. And again, I will demonstrate why the change should
be understood as a product of the Court’s attempt to integrate revolutionary
achievements into West Germany’s constitutional order. I will argue that the
East German revolutionaries, expecting large-scale privatizations of
government-owned apartments in the GDR upon German unification, had
called for strong constitutional tenant protection. This call had been
transferred to unified Germany, where it collided with stronger constitutional
landlord protection under Art. 14 I GG. My thesis is that the Court’s decision
is best understood as an attempt to integrate the two competing positions in
the light of the legislature’s inability to do so.
In the following I will analyze the decision, present and criticize the
traditional understanding of the change it has brought about, and finally
present my own view.

1.The Decision
In its May 26, 1993 decision, BVerfG rejects a tenant’s argument that a
district court’s verdict confirming the tenant’s obligation to vacate the
apartment violates the tenant’s basic rights, in particular her right to property
based on Art. 14 I, 1 GG.325 Still, the BVerfG uses the case to say something
that it had never said before: the tenant’s lease-based right to ownership in
the rented apartment is property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG.326 In doing
so, the Court, for the first time, perceives of the tenant’s right to ownership
as property and thus provides equal constitutional protection for landlords
and tenants under Art. 14 GG.327
Prior to this decision, the Court had considered the tenant’s right to
ownership only within the landlord’s property’s social obligation under Art.

324. See Horst Sendler, Unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte durch die Hintertür?,
NJW 1994, 709 et seq. with examples from the field of private law; Matthias Schmidt-Preuß,
Nachbarschutz des Mieter-Eigentümers?, NJW 1995, 27 et seq. with a public law example.
325. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 16 et seq.
326. Id., rec. 19.
327. For a historical overview, see Helmut Rittstieg, Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem
(1976).
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14 II GG.328 As a result, landlords had enjoyed stronger constitutional
protection than tenants because tenant protection was considered an intrusion
into the landlord’s property, which could only be justified if it was necessary
for the public good.329
The decision is interesting for several reasons. First, it was not
necessary for the Court to elaborate on the property quality of the tenant’s
right to ownership in order to decide the case. The Court could have left the
question open because, regardless of whether or not the tenant’s right to
ownership was property, in the specific case the Court concluded that it had
not been violated because the district Court had undertaken all necessary
considerations to justify the lease’s cancellation and the tenant’s eviction
from the apartment.330 Second, leaving the question open would have been
exactly what the Court had been doing before.331 Why did the Court break
with this tradition? The Court itself states its key argument as follows:
The apartment is everybody’s center of private existence. The
individual depends upon its use for the satisfaction of fundamental needs in
life as well as for the protection of his freedom and the development of his
personality. A large part of the population, however, cannot resort to
property in order to satisfy its need for housing but is forced to rent. Under
these conditions the tenant’s right to ownership fulfills functions that are
typically fulfilled by property in goods.332
Interestingly, in previous decisions the Court had already considered
the apartment’s importance as a “center of human existence”333 and as “the
spatial center of private life”.334 It had also considered that most people
cannot afford to buy but have to rent.335 However, such considerations had
never led the Court to establish a functional equivalence between the tenant’s
right to ownership and property in goods. Instead, it had always considered

328. See Peter Derleder, in: Gert Brüggemeier & Rudolf Wassermann et al. (eds.),
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 3, Besonderes Schuldrecht, Reihe
Alternativkommentare, Vorbemerkung zu §§ 535 et seq. para. 55 (1979).
329. See BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 29, 30; BVerfGE 82, 6, juris-version, rec.
34; and BVerfGE 83, 82, juris-version, rec. 15.
330. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 32; see also Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2561,
2562.
331. See, for example, BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 29; and BVerfG 83, 82, jurisversion, rec. 18.
332. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 21 (my italics).
333. BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 30.
334. BVerfGE, 82, 6, juris-version, rec. 34.
335. Id., rec. 33 with further references.
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the tenant’s interests within the framework of the landlord’s property’s social
obligation under Art. 14 II GG, i.e., as justifications to interfere with the
landlord’s right to property.336 What accounts for the change?
The Court tries to explain it doctrinally: “The essential criterion of
property in the sense of Art. 14 GG is that a proprietary right is assigned to
its holder for exclusionary private use and disposal as is the case with respect
to property in goods.”337 Protected as property are thus “all proprietary rights
that are assigned to their holder by the law in a way that the holder is allowed
to exercise all entitlements flowing from these rights for his private benefit
according to his own responsible decision.”338 The tenant’s right to
ownership, the Court argues, fulfills these requirements. It gives the tenant
an exclusive right to use and dispose of the apartment by, for example,
subletting it to others, even if the right to sublet depends on the landlord’s
consent and is thus limited.339 The Court concludes that, since the tenant’s
right to ownership fulfills the definitional requirements of property, it must
be considered property.340 So far, so good.
The problem is that these requirements for the consideration of a
proprietary right as property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG were not new in
1993.341 Moreover, the tenant’s right to ownership based on West
Germany’s law has always fulfilled them. Why then did the Court wait until
1993 to draw its conclusion? The question becomes even more puzzling if
one considers that Johann Friedrich Henschel, the justice in charge of
landlord-tenant issues on the Court’s First Senate at the time, had published
an article in 1989 in which he emphasized that he saw no reason why the
tenant’s right to ownership in the rented apartment should be considered
property.342 Henschel argued that tenants were sufficiently protected under
the landlord’s property’s social obligation.343
The literature offers different traditional arguments for what the Court
did and why.

336. See BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 30; BVerfGE 82, 6, juris-version, rec. 33,
34 with further references; and BVerfGE 83, 82, juris-version, rec. 15 with further references.
337. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 20.
338. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 20.
339. Id., rec. 23, 24.
340. Id.
341. The Court explicitly refers to BVerfGE 83, 201, 208, 209, 210; see BVerfGE 89, 1,
juris-version, rec. 20, 23, 24.
342. Johann Friedrich Henschel, Eigentumsgewährleistung und Mieterschutz, NJW 1989,
937, 938 et seq.
343. Id., at 939.
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2. Traditional Understanding.
The literature’s response to the Court’s decision is mixed but mostly
critical.344 Again, doctrinal and judicial policy arguments may be
distinguished.
One author denies Art. 14 GG’s applicability to landlord-tenant
relationships.345 If the legislature wants to protect the tenant, the argument
goes, it must do so within the constitutional framework of freedom of
contract (Art. 2 GG), human dignity (Art. 1 GG), and the social-state clause
(Art. 20 I, 28 I GG).346 Tenant protection, it is argued, interferes with the
landlord’s freedom of contract, not with her property.347 Neither does tenant
protection serve the “public good” in the sense of Art. 14 II, 2 GG; it only
serves tenants.348 Another argument brought forth against the property
quality of the tenant’s right to ownership is that a tenant cannot dispose of
the apartment because a sublet requires the landlord’s consent.349 Finally, it
is argued that the Court’s decision splits property in the apartment into the
tenant’s property comprising the right to use the apartment on the one hand
and the landlord’s property comprising the right to dispose of the apartment
on the other.350 Split property, however, is said to be unknown in German
law and “would be a source of steady conflict”.351
I think these arguments are easily refutable. If the legislature limits the
landlord’s right to cancel a lease and evict the tenant, it does not only
interfere with the landlord’s freedom of contract but also with her right to
use her property.352 The latter is an important right protected under Art. 14
I, 1 GG. Tenant protection, on the other hand, does serve the public good
because a vast majority of the people depend on renting. Hence, asserting
that tenant protection has nothing to do with Art. 14 GG ignores an important
constitutional aspect of the problem. Regarding “the right to disposal” as a

344. See, for example, Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2561; Rüthers, supra note 322, 2587.
345. See Gerd Roellecke, Das Mietrecht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts - Kritik einer
Argumentationsfigur, NJW 1992, 1649, 1652 et seq.
346. Id., at 1652-54.
347. Id., at 1652.
348. Id., at 1652-53.
349. Id., at 1653; Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2563.
350. Roellecke, supra note 345, 1653; Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2563.
351. Roellecke, supra note 345, 1653.
352. For example, by living in the apartment herself.
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property requirement, the Court rightly points out that the tenant does have
a limited right to dispose of the apartment by, for example, subletting it with
the landlord’s consent. The Court is, moreover, right in that it has never
required an unlimited right to disposal in order to consider a proprietary right
property.353 Neither is there a “substantive” reason to add such a requirement
now.354 That German law supposedly does not know split property and that
split property will turn out to be a source of steady conflict is hardly
convincing either. First, based on the Court’s decision, the tenant does not
hold property in the apartment but in her right to ownership in the apartment.
Hence, doctrinally speaking, there is no split property in the apartment.
Second, it is hard to see why protecting tenant and landlord equally under
Art. 14 GG might cause more conflict than protecting the tenant under Art.
14 II GG and the landlord under Art. 14 I GG. The conflict between the two
remains the same because it is based on their conflicting interests. What has
changed is the weight that the Court is willing to attribute to the tenant’s
constitutional position in this conflict; this weight has been increased, which
I think is a necessary consequence of equal protection.
A more fundamental critique attacks the Court’s main argument that the
tenant’s right to ownership must be deemed property because it “fulfills
functions that are typically fulfilled by property in goods.” Voices in the
literature reject the idea that a right’s function may justify its constitutional
protection because that would damage the protection of freedom.355 “The
protection of property,” the argument goes, “safeguards the possession of
goods for the purpose of freedom”;356 if the constitutional protection of
freedom depends on the function for which that freedom is used, the freedom
becomes an obligation.357
I think this argument is wrong for two reasons. First, a widely accepted
original justification for the constitutional protection of property is
functional. The protection of property has the “function” of securing the
individual’s economic freedom in order to enable her to autonomously shape

353. The Court explicitly refers to BVerfGE 83, 201, 209, where it had said that before;
see BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 24.
354. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 24.
355. Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2563; similarly Walter Leisner, Eigentum, in: Josef
Isensee & Paul Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Band VI, § 149 paras. 90 et seq. (1989) with further references.
356. Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2563.
357. Id.
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her life358 and participate in society.359 That does not mean that property is
only protected if it is actually used in this way. It means that the fundamental
justification and legitimization of constitutional property protection is based
on the property’s function for the individual’s life and participation in
society. It is this concept that the Court applied in its May 1993 decision to
justify why a tenant’s right to ownership should be protected as property. If
authors want to criticize this concept, they must to come up with a new
justification for why private property should be constitutionally protected.
As far as I can see, none of the critics has done that.
The second reason is that the authors’ claim that only proprietors of
goods are protected under Art. 14 I GG is arbitrary. Art. 14 GG’s text does
not provide any basis for it. It only protects property without specifying what
must be considered property.360 In fact, the authors’ assertion expresses a
specific, a liberal understanding of individual rights. According to this
understanding, individual rights serve to prevent government interference
with society.361 By arbitrarily limiting the constitutional protection of
property to proprietors of goods, these authors try to constitutionalize a
laissez-faire ideology. They ignore social requirements for the realization of
individual freedom and try to preserve the social status quo in favor of a
property-holding economic elite.362 The Court rejects this ideology and
explicitly takes social reality into account when it argues that “[a] large part
of the population . . . cannot resort to property to satisfy its need for housing
but is forced to rent. Under these circumstances the tenant’s right to
ownership fulfills functions that are typically fulfilled by property in
goods.”363
There is nothing in the text of the GG that requires, or even justifies, a
purely liberal understanding of constitutional property protection.364 To the
358. See Papier, in Theodor Maunz & Günther Dürig, Grundgesetz, Art. 14 para. 1 with
references to the BVerfG’s established case-law.
359. See Id., para. 4.
360. The GG does not define property; see BVerfGE 36, 281, 290; BVerfGE 42, 263, 292,
293.
361. See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie, 119 et seq. (2nd
ed. 1992).
362. See Rittstieg, supra note 326, 296 et seq. with a fitting referral to Holmes’ dissent in
Lochner v. New York, see id., 297.
363. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 21.
364. In this respect, I profoundly disagree with Böckenförde, who writes that the civilliberal theory reflects the basic normative intention of the basic rights of the GG in response
to fundamental violations of freedom during the Third Reich; see Böckenförde, supra note
361, 143. Rittstieg has demonstrated that a civil-liberal understanding of constitutional
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contrary, a liberal understanding of property protection was prevalent in
Germany at a time when economic elites were trying to use property
protection under Art. 153 of the Weimar Constitution (WRV) in order to
protect their possessions and the social status quo against an increasingly
democratic legislature.365 It is the concept of constitutional property
protection developed by a Reichsgericht (RG) controlled by conservative
forces starting in 1921.366 The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) further developed
the RG’s concept after 1949 in order to prevent alternative property concepts
promoted by social-democratic forces in West Germany.367 Many
conservative voices still see the preservation of the economic, social, and
political status quo as an important function of property protection under Art.
14 I GG.368 However, alternative property concepts were, and are, possible
under the GG. Art. 14 I GG explicitly states, “Property and the right of
inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by
the laws.”369 It is this authority of the legislature to specify property
protection that the BVerfG refers to in its May 1993 decision when it argues
that the legislature has taken account of the apartment’s social function for
the tenant by designing the tenant’s right to ownership in the apartment in a
way that this right is assigned to the tenant like property in goods.370 On this
basis, it can be concluded that the Court only respects, and gives
constitutional expression to, the legislature’s design of the tenant’s right to
ownership in the apartment when it concludes that this right must be
considered property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG.
Other authors blame the Court for engaging in judicial politics by
putting the tenant’s right to ownership on a new constitutional basis even
though that was not necessary to decide the case.371 Otto Depenheuer, for
example, complains that the Court has succumbed to the Zeitgeist that has
protection against a democratic legislature has less to do with the Third Reich than it is the
continuation of an economic elite’s strategy to preserve the social status quo against the
potential of a democratic legislature; see Rittstieg, supra note 326, 286 et seq.
365. See Rittstieg, supra note 326, 252 et seq., 269-271; more generally Ingeborg Maus,
Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus, 47 et seq. (1980).
366. See Rittstieg, supra notes, 252 et seq., 256 et seq. referring to RGZ 102, 161, and
note 326.
367. See Rittstieg, supra note, 286 et seq., 288, 289 et seq., and 326.
368. See Papier, supra note 358, Art. 14 para. 5.
369. My italics.
370. See BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version,rec. 21, 22.
371. See Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2562; the original reads: “Nicht aus juristischer Not
geboren, erweist sie [die Entscheidung] sich als Akt rechtspolitischen Wollens:
Verfassungsgebung durch Verfassungsrichterspruch.”
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called for a “basic right to housing” or an equivalent state goal.372 A different
judicial-politics criticism blames the Court for a lack of economic
understanding. Its main point is that by increasing tenants’ constitutional
protection the Court alienates potential investors in the housing market and
thus contributes to the lack of affordable housing.373 Apart from the fact that
these authors do not provide any empirical data to support their views, they
obviously overlook the possibility that the Court may have engaged in
constitutional interpretation to reach its conclusion.
Finally, there are doctrinal as well as judicial-politics arguments
supporting the Court’s decision. One argument is that housing’s social
importance requires stronger constitutional tenant protection.374 Another
argument is that tenants’ and landlords’ legal positions are so similar that
equal constitutional protection is justified.375 Helmut Rittstieg, finally, has
been demanding property protection for tenants since 1975. He argues that
the tenant’s right to ownership in the apartment is a proprietary right based
on which the tenant has immediate control over the apartment and uses it as
her “space of freedom for independent activities”. The BVerfG has always
held the protection of such a right to be the purpose of property protection
under Art. 14 I GG.376 Hence, Rittstieg, already in 1975, pointed to the
rented apartment’s social function in order to justify the protection of the
tenant’s right to ownership as property.377
Whatever one may think of these arguments, none of them can explain
why the Court had not taken them up between 1975, when they were first
voiced, and 1993. Moreover, they cannot explain why in May 1993 the
Court, all of a sudden, did follow Rittstieg’s argument and granted tenants
property protection under Art. 14 I GG. As in the previous cases, the
traditional understanding is thus unable to convincingly explain the
constitutional change.

372. Id.
373. See Rüthers, supra note 322, 2588, 2589; also Henschel, supra note 342, 943.
374. See Derleder, supra note 328, para. 56.
375. See Rudolf Gärtner, Wohnungsmietrechtlicher Bestandsschutz auf dem Weg zu
einem dinglichen Recht?, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 1994, 446; Udo Wolter, Mietrechtlicher
Bestandsschutz: historische Entwicklung seit 1800 und geltendes WohnraumKündigungsschutzrecht, 396 et seq. (1984).
376. Rittstieg, supra note 326, 331 referring to BVerfGE 24, 367, 389, 400.
377. In fact, Lorenz von Stein, already in 1850, wrote that “[e]very possession . . . is . . .
the body of real personal freedom and freedom’s outer condition” (emphasis added) (“Jeder
Besitz . . . ist . . . der Körper der wirklichen persönlichen Freiheit und ihre äussere
Bedingung“); see Lorenz von Stein, The History of the Social Movement in France, 1789 1850, Bd. 2, p. 57 (Kaethe Mengelberg ed. & transl., Bedminster Press 1964).
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The following analysis will show that things become much clearer once
the decision is put into historical perspective. As soon as one takes into
account that a successful revolution had taken place in the GDR in 1989, that
a constitutional right to housing had been an important achievement of this
Revolution, and that this achievement had been transferred to unified
Germany where the institutions were then confronted with the task of
integrating it into the existing constitutional order under the GG, a new and
more meaningful understanding of the Court’s decision will emerge.
3. My Understanding: the decision as an act of integration
My thesis is that with its decision the Court tried to integrate the
revolutionary achievement of a constitutional right to housing into West
Germany’s constitutional order under the GG, which had granted stronger
constitutional protection to landlords than to tenants.
In West Germany, only the landlord’s position had been protected as
property under Art. 14 I GG. Tenant protection had been considered an
interference with landlord property and thus required justification as serving
the public good (Art. 14 II, 2 GG). This had resulted in a weaker
constitutional protection of tenants, even though the Court had taken into
account both the rented apartment’s function as the center of human
existence and the fact that most people depended on renting. On this basis,
the Court had left the question of whether or not a tenant’s right to ownership
in the rented apartment must be considered property in the sense of Art. 14
I, 1 GG explicitly open as late as November 1990.378
A change of constitutional dimensions had taken place in the fall of
1989 with the successful Revolution in the GDR and in October 1990 with
German unification. The Revolution’s call for a constitutional right to
housing had its conceptual basis in the citizens’ movement’s concept of
individual empowerment, which had been translated into, inter alia, a call
for constitutional social rights, not only as objective state goals but as
judicially enforceable individual constitutional rights.379 Underlying was the
insight that appropriate housing is one of the most fundamental necessities
that need to be fulfilled to make human freedom a reality.380
The people in the streets had supported the citizens’ movement’s

378. See BVerfGE 83, 82, juris-version, rec. 15, 18; the decision dates from Nov. 13, 1990,
1 BvR 275/90; see also BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 29, 30.
379. See supra, 62 et seq., 106 et seq., 115 et seq.
380. See supra, 58 et seq.
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concept of individual empowerment, including the call for a constitutional
right to housing. This is reflected, among others, in the fact that 90% of the
East Germans had been in favor of including a constitutional right to housing
in a new constitution for unified Germany.381
The popular call for a constitutional right to housing had found its legal
manifestation in the revolutionaries’ Social Charter and in their draft
constitution.382 The Social Charter demanded a “basic right to housing and
effective tenant protection” in the light of strong insecurity with respect to
property questions upon unification.383 Against this background, the Social
Charter put a stronger emphasis on rent regulation and tenant protection
against arbitrary lease cancellations than on the provision of new housing.384
The draft constitution included detailed provisions on a right to housing.385
Art. 25 (1), 1 of the draft guaranteed every citizen a “right to appropriate
housing”. Art. 25 (1) stated that legal protection against lease cancellation
must be provided. Art. 25 (1), 3 explicitly elaborated on how to balance
landlords’ and tenants’ interests: “When balancing tenants’ and landlords’
interests against each other, special weight must be accorded to the
apartment’s outstanding importance for living a life in human dignity.”386
The draft constitution, thus, accorded particular constitutional weight to the
tenant’s interests based on the rented apartment’s function for the tenant’s
life.387 Finally, Art. 25 (1), 4 strengthened the tenant’s position even further
by stating that a tenant may only be evicted from an apartment once a
substitute apartment is available.388
An institutional reaction to the revolutionaries’ call for a constitutional
right to housing had come from the post-revolutionary GDR’s first freely
elected government. The government’s coalition agreement stated that
“[w]hen amending the GG, it is the government’s goal to introduce social
rights as non-enforceable individual rights. This applies primarily to the
right to labor, housing, and education.”389 The government declaration of
April 19, 1990, emphasized the government’s responsibility for appropriate
381. See Jaggi, supra note 1, 70, 71.
382. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 594 et seq.
383. Markus Bremers, Soziale Staatsziele und soziale Grundrechte: Arbeit, Wohnen,
soziale Sicherung, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, 141; Jaggi, supra note 6, 595, 596.
384. Bremers, supra note 383, 141.
385. See also Jaggi, supra note 6, 596 et seq.
386. My italics.
387. See Bremers, supra note 383, 147; Rogner, supra note 129, 92.
388. Id.
389. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 606 et seq. (my italics).
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housing, tenant protection, and rent control.390
The importance that constitutional tenant protection had acquired
during the 1989 Revolution must be seen in the light of the fact that most
people in the GDR had been tenants. It was mostly the government who had
acted as landlord, and even private landlord-tenant relationships had been
strongly regulated.391 Facing unification, East Germans feared the impact on
their leases of West Germany’s so-called social market economy with its
foreseeable privatizations of government owned apartments. For East
Germans, tenant protection was thus much more important than the provision
of new housing. In that situation, a constitutional right to housing aimed at
forcing even the most conservative legislature to provide for strong tenant
protection upon German unification.
The UT and most of the new state constitutions had transferred the
revolutionary achievement of a constitutional right to housing to unified
Germany.392 As a matter of principle, West German landlord-tenant law
entered into force in the new states upon German unification on October 3,
1990.393 Yet, the UT provided for important exemptions, for example, by
keeping in force in the new states specified provisions of the GDR’s tenant
protection law.394 For leases signed in the GDR prior to unification the
landlord’s right to cancellation remained much more limited than it would
have been under the Civil Code in West Germany.395 A cancellation of such
leases for the landlord’s own use, for instance, was, as a matter of principle,
only possible after December 31, 1995.396 Moreover, the UT temporarily
limited the landlord’s right to increase rents.397 For example, it stipulated
that a GDR regulation of June 25, 1990, according to which rent increases
were allowed only under very limited conditions remained in force until
December 31, 1991, for already existing residential property.398 Finally, Art.
390. See Id., 607 et seq.
391. Generally on the legal position of tenants in the GDR, see Eckard Pahlke, Die
Rechtsstellung des Mieters von Wohnraum in der DDR (1983).
392. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 617 et seq.
393. See Art. 232 § 2 Abs. 1 EGBGB in the UT’s version of 31.08.1990 (BGBl II 1990,
885, 943).
394. Volker Emmerich, in: J. von Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch,
Zweites Buch, Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, §§ 535 - 563, Vorb. zu §§ 535, 536 paras. 31,
34 (13th ed. 1995).
395. See Art. 232 § 2 Abs. 2 – 4 EGBGB.
396. See Gesetz zur Verlängerung der Wartefristen v. 21.12.1992 (BGBl I 1992, 217);
Emmerich, in: Staudinger, Vorb. zu §§ 535, 536 para. 32.
397. See Emmerich, supra note 394, paras. 33 et seq.
398. See UT, Anlage II z. EVertr, Kapitel V, Sachgebiet A - Allgemeines Wirtschaftsrecht,
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5 UT “recommended” to unified Germany’s legislature to think about
adopting a right to housing as a constitutional state goal.
Most new state constitutions contained a right to housing in the sense
of a government obligation to protect tenants against unreasonable rent
increases and arbitrary lease cancellations.399 In addition, the state of
Brandenburg’s constitution had taken over the revolutionaries’ draft
constitution’s provision according to which special consideration must be
given to the apartment’s importance for the tenant to live a life in human
dignity when weighing the tenant’s and the landlord’s interests against each
other.400 The Brandenburg constitution further increased tenant protection
by taking over the draft constitution’s provision according to which a tenant
may only be evicted from an apartment once a substitute apartment is
available.401
Again, unified Germany’s legislature was failing to answer the call. The
most promising attempt to integrate the revolutionary achievement of a
constitutional right to housing into a new constitution for unified Germany
had been undertaken by the Kuratorium. Art. 13a of the Kuratorium’s Draft
stated:
The government protects the right of every human being to appropriate
housing. It promotes the construction and preservation of social and
ecological housing. It ensures affordable rents and provides protection
against lease cancellation, which duly considers the outstanding importance
of housing for living a life in human dignity.
This proposal, however, had not become law. Neither had the
Bundesrat’s Commission402 or the GVK403 been able to agree on a
constitutional right to housing or on any other constitutional social right, for
that matter.
This was the situation when the Court, in May 1993, decided to grant
constitutional property protection to the tenant’s right to ownership in the
rented apartment. The Court had still been able to leave open the question
Wirtschaftspolitik, Wettbewerbs- und Preisrecht, Abschnitt III, Nr. 1 lit. a dd); Emmerich,
supra note 394, paras. 34, 35 listing further limitations.
399. See CONSTITUTIONS OF BRANDENBURG, Art. 47 I; SAXONY, Art. 7; SAXONY-ANHALT,
Art. 40; and MECKLENBURG-WEST POMERANIA, ART. 17 II; and Jaggi, supra note 6, 623 et
seq.
400. CONSTITUTION OF BRANDENBURG, Art. 47 II.
401. Id.
402. See Report of the Bundesrat’s Commission Constitutional Reform, in: Fischer &
Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 450, 451.
403. See GVK Report, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 587 et seq., 591 et
seq.
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in a decision on November 13, 1990.404 Even though the revolutionary
people had already spoken, a little more than a month after unification it had
been difficult for the Court to know what exactly they had said. Moreover,
in November 1990 the Court had not been able know whether or not the
legislature would live up to the task of integrating the revolutionary
achievements into the existing West German constitutional order. The
political debate over what to make of the 1989 Revolution and its impact on
unified Germany’s constitutional law had still been in an early phase. The
UT, even though it had provided for a transfer of specific tenant protection
provisions from the post-revolutionary GDR to unified Germany, had left
the decision of whether or not to adopt constitutional social state goals to
unified Germany’s legislature (Art. 5 UT). The UT had given the legislature
until the end of 1992 to decide the issue. Against this background, in
November 1990 it had still been reasonable for the Court to leave the
question open.
By May 1993, however, the situation had changed fundamentally. Not
only was it clear by now that the revolutionary East Germans had achieved
a constitutional right to housing. It had also become clear that unified
Germany’s legislature was not getting anywhere with its efforts to integrate
this revolutionary achievement into the West German constitutional order
under the GG.405 At the same time, rents in the new East German states were
exploding. Where rents for residential housing in the GDR had been less
than one East Mark per square meter, they had increased to an average of
seven West Marks per square meter by 1993.406
In this situation, it was no longer possible for the Court to close its eyes
to the revolutionaries’ demands. It had to do what the legislature had turned
out to be unable to do: integrate the revolutionary achievement of a
constitutional right to housing into the GG. Confronted with an East German
claim to weigh the tenant’s constitutional position stronger than the
landlord’s and West Germany’s GG under which the tenant’s constitutional
position was weaker than the landlord’s, the Court decided to grant both
tenant and landlord equally strong constitutional protection under Art. 14

404. BVerfGE 82-83, juris-version, rec. 18.
405. See Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2564 referring to Mitteilung des Sekretariats der
GVK über die Abstimmungsergebnisse zu den Themenkomplexen “Staatsziele und
Grundrechte” v. 24.02.1993, S. 3.
406. Joachim Tesch & Klaus-Jürgen Warnick, Staatliche Wohnungsversorgung und
kapitalistischer Wohnungsmarkt - Vom DDR Wohnungsbauprogramm zum
Stadtumbauprogramm Ost, Forum Wissenschaft 2/2004.
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GG.407
The Court’s strongest argument for this decision is remarkably close to
the revolutionaries’ draft constitution’s justification for a constitutional right
to housing. Both are explicitly based on the rented apartment’s social
function to help realize the tenant’s individual freedom and personal
development.408
Both are rooted in the principle of individual
empowerment, according to which social reality must be taken into account
in order to make constitutional individual rights a social reality for everyone.
The Court’s reasoning also reflects the revolutionary constitutional concept
of equality of freedom409 by granting landlord and tenant equal constitutional
protection based on their rights’ equal social function to realize individual
liberty and personal development. Another important respect in which the
Court has brought to bear the revolutionaries’ achievement of a
constitutional right to housing is that the Court has granted the tenant her
own constitutional right. Even if there had been different versions of this
idea in the catalogue of revolutionary demands (from a judicially enforceable
individual constitutional right to a constitutional state goal), the
revolutionaries had clearly wanted the tenant’s constitutional position to be
more than only a social-obligation annex to the landlord’s property
protection. This revolutionary demand is reflected in the Court’s decision to
consider the tenant’s right to ownership in the apartment to be property in
the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG, i.e. an individual constitutional right.410 This
individual right provides for particularly strong constitutional tenant
protection in the light of the fact that, under the GG, individual rights may
be interpreted as individual claims against the legislature to provide for
effective individual rights protection. The Court, in its decision on May 26,
1993, has brought all these elements from the revolutionaries’ constitutional
agenda to bear on unified Germany’s constitutional law, even if the Court
did not explicitly refer to the 1989 Revolution in its reasoning.
Against this background, it no longer appears as a “timely coincidence”
407. The Court explicitly emphasizes this, see BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 29
(“Namentlich folgt aus dem Eigentumsschutz des Besitzrechts nicht, daß im Konflikt beider
duch die Verfassung geschützten Eigentumspositionen das Bestandsinteresse des Mieters in
jedem Falle vorgeht”).
408. See Art. 25 (1) RTD.
409. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 586.
410. Depenheuer writes that “. . . demands for a ‘basic right to housing’ or the introduction
of a respective state goal reflect the tendency of a constitutional upgrade of tenants’ interests,”
see Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2562. However, he does not establish the connection
between this “tendency” and specific constitutional demands by the revolutionary East
Germans; see Id.
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that the Court acted as a “substitute legislature” hardly more than three
months after the GVK had rejected the introduction of a constitutional state
goal to protect a tenant’s right to housing.411 By integrating the revolutionary
achievement of a constitutional right to housing into unified Germany’s
existing constitutional order under the GG the Court, once again, engaged in
integration through constitutional interpretation.

D. Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that unified Germany’s constitutional law
experienced important changes upon German unification. A state goal of
environmental protection was added, the Bodenreform-expropriations were
confirmed, a government obligation to realize gender equality was adopted,
the requirement of criminal punishment of abortion during the first twelve
weeks of the pregnancy was given up, and the tenant’s right to ownership in
the rented apartment was granted property protection under Art. 14 I GG.
The article has also demonstrated that traditional arguments are unable
to convincingly explain these changes. They cannot explain why the changes
occurred when they occurred. Doctrinal arguments appear arbitrary and
strongly determined by the desired outcome. Judicial politics arguments give
up too quickly on the possibility of explaining the changes as results of
constitutional interpretation. All traditional arguments have in common that
they ignore the possibility of the 1989 Revolution’s impact on unified
Germany’s constitutional law.
My analysis shows that the changes reflect the attempt by unified
Germany’s institutions to integrate revolutionary achievements into the
existing constitutional order under the GG. The legislature’s adoption of
environmental protection as a state goal, for example, shows signs of an
integration of the revolutionary call for a constitutional right to
environmental protection into a constitutional order that did not know
constitutional environmental protection. The BVerfG’s decision to uphold
the confirmation of the Bodenreform-expropriations appears like the
integration of the revolutionary demand to confirm the Bodenreform into a
constitutional order that requires to return illegally expropriated property to
former owners by adding to Art. 143 III GG a governmental obligation to
compensate former owners. The introduction of a government obligation to

411. See Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2564 referring to the Mitteilung des Sekretariats der
GVK über die Abstimmungsergebnisse zu den Themenkomplexen “Staatsziele und
Grundrechte” v. 24.02.1993, S. 3.
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realize gender equality shows clear signs of integrating the revolutionary call
for real equality for women into a constitutional order that took a formallegal approach to gender equality. The development of a counseling model
for the legal treatment of abortion appears like the integration of the
revolutionary principle of individual empowerment and a woman’s right to
abortion into a constitutional order that is unable to compromise the unborn
child’s right to life. And finally, the introduction of property protection for
the tenant’s right to ownership in the rented apartment can be explained as
the integration of a revolutionary call for a constitutional right to housing
into a constitutional order that provided for stronger constitutional protection
of landlords. Contrary to the traditional understanding, these explanations
take account of both the 1989 Revolution’s constitutional meaning for
unified Germany and the possibility of constitutional interpretation.
My analysis, thus, demonstrates that, despite Ackerman’s thesis of
Germany as an example for “elitist constitutionalism,” the German BVerfG
has not only projected itself “as the preeminent guardian of Germany’s post1945 foundational commitments”.412 After German unification in 1990, it
has engaged in revolutionary reform through constitutional interpretation.
Some of the 1989 Revolution’s constitutional achievements have thus had a
substantive impact on unified Germany’s constitutional law, which,
therefore, is, at least to some extent, a co-production between the
revolutionary East Germans and West Germany, even without a formal
plebiscite on a new constitution for unified Germany. Unified Germany’s
constitutional law is thus also an example for the revolutionary model.

412. See supra, p. 2.
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